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TOO CLOSE TO THE RACK AND THE SCREW:
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON TORTURE
IN THE WAR ON TERROR
Seth F. Kreim
INTRODUCTION
There are some articles I never thought I would have to write; this
is one.
Torture has never been a favorite of American law. Whatever the
transgressions of street-level bureaucrats,' it has not been a tradition-
ally avowed instrument of American policy. 2 However, as the current
trope goes, everything has changed after September 11.
In the immediate aftermath of that tragedy, law enforcement offi-
cials confronted with recalcitrant suspected terrorists let it be known
that they were seriously considering resorting to chemical interven-
tions and outright physical abuse to obtain information that could aid
them in preventing a recurrence. According to the Department of
Justice's Inspector General, physical abuse has in fact occurred.4 As
the United States began its military response, reports of harsh treat-
ment of captives who might have information began to filter back to
Associate Dean and Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. This Article
has benefited from the helpful comments of Jacques deLisle, Leo Katz, Stephen Morse, Gerry
Neuman, and David Rudovsky, as well as the superb research assistance of Indraneel Sur. My
thanks belong to them, any remaining errors or misconceptions are solely my own.
See Seth F. Kreimer, Explonng the Dark Matter ofJudicial Review: A Constitutional Census of the
1990s, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.J. 427, 470 (1997) [hereinafter Kreimer, Dark Matter] (describ-
ing the prevalence of constitutional claims against street-level bureaucrats for abuse of force).
Justice Joseph Story believed that the Eighth Amendment "would seem to be wholly un-
necessary in a free government, since it is scarcely possible, that any department of such a gov-
ernment should authorize, or justify such atrocious conduct." JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 710 (Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833).
3 E.g., Walter Pincus, Silence of 4 Terror Probe Suspects Poses Dilemmafor FBI, WASH. POST, Oct.
21, 2001, at A6 (reporting proposals of truth drugs and "pressure tactics");Jon Riley, The War on
Terror; Probe Stymied by Silence, Weighing How to Get Suspects to Cooperate, NEWSDAY, Nov. 4, 2001, at
A39 (reporting former State Department official's advocacy of "human rights violations").
4 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE
TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE
INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 142 (2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/igspecrl.htm. See id. at 142-50, for a more specific account of the
"pattern of physical and verbal abuse against some September 11 detainees" at the Metropolitan
Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON TORTURE
the United States." Most recently, America's war with and subsequent
occupation of Iraq has spawned accounts of physical abuse and tor-
ture.
In response to these reports, the current administration issued a
statement that has been read as disavowing torture as a tool.' Parsed
carefully, however, the statement may forswear less than it appears to.
The statement accurately recounts that the United States has ratified
the Convention Against Torture,8 then goes on to state that the cur-
rent administration fully intends to abide by the Convention as rati-
fied. The statement does not, however, highlight the fact that the
United States interprets the Convention as distinguishing between
"torture"--defined as an act that inflicts "severe pain or suffering" for
prohibited purposes-and other "cruel, inhuman or degrading prac-
tices" which are subject to lower levels of condemnation. Nor does it
5 See, e.g., Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations: "Stress
and Duress" Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities, WASH. POST, Dec. 26,
2002, at Al (providing accounts of interrogation techniques in American detention facilities,
including "stress and duress" methods, and the criminal investigation into the death of two
prisoners at a U.S.-occupied air base); Philip Shenon, Officials Say Qaeda Suspect Has Given Useful
Information, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2002, at A12 ("[S]uspects will not be subjected to any form of
torture. But officials said other, nonviolent forms of coercion were being used, including sleep
deprivation and a variety of psychological techniques that are meant to inspire fear.").
See, e.g., Owen Bowcott, Troops Accused of Torture, GUARDIAN (London),July 24, 2003, at 4
(containing account of interrogation technique of occupation forces);Jim Krane, US. Interroga-
tions Draw Fire, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake City), July 1, 2003, at A4 (same). There have
been repeated reports of threats to "render" suspects to countries where torture is practiced.
See, e.g., Priest & Gellman, supra note 5, at Al ("Some who do not cooperate are turned over-
'rendered,' in official parlance-to foreign intelligence services whose practice of torture has
been documented by the U.S. government and human rights organizations."). Such practices
violate American treaty obligations. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, art. 3, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-
20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 114 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture] (prohibiting the
use of torture by any State party in any territory under its jurisdiction and proscribing the ex-
pulsion of any person to another State "where there are substantial grounds for believing that
he would be in danger of being subjected to terror"). However, such issues of territoriality lie
beyond the specific constitutional obligations explored in this Article.
I Letter from WilliamJ. Haynes II, General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, to Sena-
tor Patrick Leahy (June 25, 2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/06/; see also
Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President, United Nations International Day
in Support of Victims of Torture (June 26, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/ ("Torture anywhere is an affront to hu-
man dignity everywhere."). For commentary reading the statement as disavowing torture, see
The Pledge, ECONOMIST, July 5, 2003, at 29, and Peter Slevin, U.S. Pledges to Avoid Torture: Pledge on
Terror Suspects Comes amid Probes of Two Deaths, WASH. POST, June 27, 2003, at Al1.
8 Convention Against Torture, supra note 6.
The Convention Against Torture itself forbids "torture," which it defines as acts that inflict
"severe pain or suffering" for prohibited purposes. Id. at 113-14 (art. 1). It imposes as well an
obligation to "undertake to prevent.., other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment. . . which do not amount to torture." Id. at 116 (art. 16). Article 16 does not carry with it
the entire series of enforcement obligations applicable to "torture" or the explicit disavowal of
an "exceptional circumstances"justification. Id. at 114 (art. 2). The statutory prohibitions on
Nov. 2003]
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reveal that this distinction has been advanced as a basis for permitting
a variety of physical abuses as techniques of interrogation. The ad-
ministration's statement does observe that the Senate's ratification of
the Convention was accompanied by reservations, among which is the
torture invoked by the Haynes letter incorporate a similar definition. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340
(2000) (providing a statutory definition of "torture").
The United States insisted in negotiations on the position that "torture" is limited to ex-
treme forms of cruel treatment, and regulations adopted by the United States to implement the
Convention explicitly provide that "[tiorture is an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treat-
ment and does not include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment that do not amount to torture." 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a) (2) (2002). See Zubeda v. Ashcroft,
333 F.3d 463, 472 (3d Cir. 2003) ("The Convention 'draws a clear distinction between torturous
acts as defined in Article 1 and acts [of cruelty] not involving torture referenced in Article 16.
The severity of the pain and suffering inflicted is a distinguishing characteristic of torture.'"
(quoting In reJ-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 295 (B.I.A. Mar. 22, 2002))). See also In reJ-E-, 23 I. & N.
Dec. at 294-95 (detailing the United States's negotiating position). In J-E-, a majority of the
United States Board of Immigration Appeals invoked this distinction to return a Haitian refu-
gee to Haiti, where he would likely face police mistreatment and indefinite imprisonment, rea-
soning that "[i]nstances of police brutality do not necessarily rise to the level of torture." Id. at
302.
10 In the 1970s in Northern Ireland, the British Army used a combination of five "tech-
niques" (hooding, extended wall standing in painful postures, loud noises, sleep deprivation,
and deprivation of food and drink) to interrogate suspects in an effort to obtain information to
use against IRA terrorists. The European Commission of Human Rights found these actions, in
combination, to be "torture" within the meaning of the European Convention on Human
Rights. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1976 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 512, 792-94 (Eur. Comm'n of
H.R.). The European Court for Human Rights reversed, determining that the combination of
these techniques constituted "inhuman and degrading treatment" prohibited under the Con-
vention, but not "torture." Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 66-67
(1978).
One official inquiry by the state of Israel relied on the Ireland case to maintain that "moder-
ate physical pressure" deployed against suspected Palestinian terrorists was consistent with in-
ternational prohibitions against "torture." See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE
METHODS OF INVESTIGATION OF THE GENERAL SECURITY SERVICE REGARDING HOSTILE TERRORIST
ACTIVITY (1987), excerpted in 23 ISR. L. REv. 146, 179-80 (1989). The Israeli Supreme Court ul-
timately prohibited these techniques, which were similar to the British techniques, as unauthor-
ized by law. See H.C. 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817
(1999), reprinted in Supreme Court of Israel: Judgment Concerning the Legality of the General
Security Service's Interrogation Methods, Sept. 6, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 1471, 1478, 1480-85. See gen-
erally, John T. Parry, What Is Torture, Are We Doing It, and What If We Are?, 64U. PiTr. L. REV. 237
(2003) (comparing U.S. conduct with that of British forces in Northern Ireland and Israeli
forces fighting terrorism).
The United States may be invoking similar distinctions in its deployment of the "stress and
duress" techniques, referred to as "torture lite." See, e.g., Jess Bravin, Interrogation School Tells
Army Recruits How Grilling Works, WALL ST.J., Apr. 26, 2002, at Al (describing some of the thirty
techniques taught to soldiers at interrogation school where instructors claim that the tech-
niques do not constitute human rights violations); Alan Cooperman, CIA Interrogation UnderFire;
Human Rights Groups Say Techniques Could Be Torture, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2002, at A9 ("Ruth
Wedgwood, a professor of law at Yale University who has advised the administration, said it is
debatable whether the CIA techniques constitute torture under the U.N.'s definition, which is
the intentional infliction of 'severe pain or suffering' to obtain information."); Paul Vallely, The
Invisible, INDEPENDENT (London), June 26, 2003, at 2 (describing "stress and duress" tech-
niques).
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proposition that the United States understands the convention's pro-
hibition of "cruel, inhuman or degrading" practices to constrain only
those practices that violate the Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amend-
ments.
If one reads the Haynes statement with the technicality that has
been invoked in other public pronouncements by the current ad-
ministration, physical or mental pressure to force answers from un-
willing subjects that does not meet the technical definition of "tor-
ture" is not wholly disavowed. It is renounced only so far as the
pressure would violate the Constitution. This reservation might be
immaterial if it were clear that American constitutional law prohib-
ited torture. However, in the wake of 9/11, at least one very public
commentator, Professor Alan Dershowitz, has advanced arguments
that under limited circumstances torture is a constitutional option.12
It is to those arguments that this Article is addressed.
1 See 136 CONG. REc. S17904 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (proposed amendments of Senator
Pell on "U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings" of the Convention Against Tor-
ture). Professor Dershowitz seems to miss the distinction between "inhuman and degrading"
practices that fall within the reservation and torture which does not, and he curiously omits ref-
erence to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in his discussion in
ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO
THE CHALLENGE 136 (2002) [hereinafter WHYTERRORISM A ORKS] (maintaining that the United
States is bound by the Convention Against Torture only to the extent that it is consistent with
the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution and referring to it as the "Geneva Convention
Against Torture").
12 See, e.g., ALAN DERSHOWITZ, SHOUTING FIRE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN A TURBULENT AGE 470-77
(2002) (arguing that there may be some circumstances where extraordinary means, including
physical torture, may be authorized in the interrogation of terrorists); WHY TERRORISM WORKS,
supra note 11, at 131-63 (arguing that inflicting nonlethal pain on a guilty terrorist who illegally
withholds information regarding an act of terrorism may be justified by preventing the loss of a
large number of lives); Alan M. Dershowitz, Is There a Torturous Road to Justice?, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
8, 2001, at B19 (proposing that torture should only be conducted where authorized by law);
Alan M. Dershowitz, Painful Moral Questions; German Issue Is One for US. Too: Can Torture, or the
Threat of It, Be Right?, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2003, at B15 ("[L]et's start the public debate about
torture, the threat of torture and other unpleasant options and tragic choices."); 60 Minutes.
Torture?: Using Torture as a Means to Get Terrorists and Other Criminals to Talk (CBS television
broadcast, Jan. 20, 2002) (presenting Dershowitz as willing to accept torture as an interrogation
tool so long as "we bring it into the legal system so that we can control it"); Hardball (MSNBC
television broadcast, Jan. 29, 2002) ("[W]e should bring it within the law"). Professor Dershow-
itz builds on arguments he made initially in advising the state of Israel on how to meet its terror-
ist threats. See generally Alan Dershowitz, Is It Necessary to Apply "Physical Pressure" to Terrorists-
And to Lie About It?, 23 ISR. L. REV. 193 (1989) (presenting circumstances where torture could be
authorized against terrorists).
The Dershowitz argument has been advanced to courts, see infra text accompanying note 44
discussing the recent Supreme Court case Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003), invoked in
public discussion, and seems to be taken seriously by military commentators, whose opinions
matter a bit more than do those of law professors. See, e.g., Major Susan J. Burger, Book Review,
174 MIL. L. REV 189, 193-94 (2002) (reviewing WHYTERRORISM WORKS, supra note 11) (arguing
that "the book's significance is that it demands that the American public and its government
confront.., dilemmas in arriving at a terrorism policy").
Nov. 20031
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
I. THE DERSHOWITZ POSITION
Professor Dershowitz does not advocate a promiscuous return to
the regime of the rack and the thumbscrew. Like most modems, he
views torture with repugnance. But in a situation where the only
means of avoiding catastrophic loss of life lies in the knowledge of a
recalcitrant prisoner, he argues, the course of least evil may be to
temporarily sacrifice the physical integrity of a single wrongdoer as a
way of saving the lives of a multitude of innocents. It is a "tragic
choice," but under circumstances where it is the only sure way to
avert looming disaster, "a sterilized needle under the fingernails" may
be the option that a government should adopt. 3 Professor Dershow-
itz further argues it is not an option that is constitutionally barred.
Professor Dershowitz begins by taking the position that as long as
the information obtained is not used in a criminal prosecution, the
protections of the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on compelled self-
incrimination are not transgressed. Further, he argues, in addressing
the constraints on deployment of force in pursuit of prevention-as
opposed to retribution-the Eighth Amendment's constraints on
cruel and unusual punishment are inapplicable. The only relevant
constitutional limitations, in his view, are the unreasonable searches
and seizures and the general commands of the due process clause.
As the relevant Fourth Amendment norm is one of "reasonableness,"
the same principles that allow the involuntary insertion of a needle to
obtain blood-alcohol tests in order to prosecute drunk drivers, would
approve the insertion of a needle bearing "truth serums" to prevent
terrorism. This would allow proportionately more serious intrusions
to prevent more serious breaches of public order, culminating in tor-
ture where absolutely essential to preserve life. So, too, he argues,
the due process clauses are "sufficiently flexible to permit an argu-
ment that the only process 'due'... is the requirement of probable
cause and [at least] some degree ofjudicial supervision.' 4
The proposal has evoked comment as well in the academy. Compare Sanford Levinson, San-
ford Levinson Replies, DISSENT, Summer 2003, at 93-94 [hereinafter Levinson, Sanford Levinson
Replies] (treating Dershowitz's arguments seriously), and Sanford Levinson, "Precommitment" and
"Postcommitment": The Ban on Torture in the Wake of September 11, 81 TEX. L. REV. 2013, 2048
(2003) [hereinafter Levinson, Precommitment] (suggesting that Dershowitz's approach seeking to
limit torture from an ex ante rather than ex post perspective be taken seriously), with WilliamJ.
Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2190 (2002) (arguing that torture
should not be deployed even in pursuit of terrorists), andJohn T. Parry & Welsh S. White, Inter-
rogating Suspected Terrorists: Should Torture Be an Option?, 63 U. PIr. L. REv. 743, 747-48 (2002)
(arguing that torture should not be a legally recognized option). This initial debate antedates
Chavez v. Martinez, discussed infra Part II.A.2.b, and none of it comes to grips with the full range
of constitutional precedent.
13 WHY TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 11, at 144.
14 Id. at 135.
[Vol. 6:2
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II. THE LAW
A. Self-Incrimination and Cruel Punishment-And Common Decency
1. The Limitations of the Clauses
Under current Supreme Court doctrine, Professor Dershowitz's
account of the constitutional protections against cruel punishment
and self-incrimination is technically correct, as far as it goes.
If anything is clear in constitutional law, it seems to be that the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual pun-
ishments" bars "torture." The original impetus for the Eighth
Amendment came from the Framers' repugnance towards the use of
torture, which was regarded as incompatible with the liberties of Eng-
lishmen.' 5 Even for those sentenced to death, the Court has held for
more than a century that "it is safe to affirm that punishments of tor-
ture ... and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are
forbidden.', 16 "Wanton infliction of physical pain" has been univer-
15 See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) ("[P]roscribing torture and barbarous
punishment was 'the primary concern of the drafters' of the Eighth Amendment...." (quoting
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976))); id. at 13-14 (Blackmun,J., concurring in the judg-
ment) ("Indeed, were we to hold to the contrary, we might place various kinds of state-
sponsored torture and abuse-of the kind ingeniously designed to cause pain but without a tell-
tale 'significant injury'-entirely beyond the pale of the Constitution."); cf id. at 26 (ThomasJ.,
dissenting) ("Many things-beating with a rubber truncheon, water torture, electric shock, in-
cessant noise . . .- may cause agony as they occur yet leave no enduring injury. The state is not
free to inflict such pains without cause just so long as it is careful to leave no marks." (quoting
Williams v. Boles, 841 F.2d 181, 183 (7th Cir. 1988))); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169
(1976) (tracing "cruel and unusual" punishment ban to English Bill of Rights of 1689, which
prohibited punishments "unauthorized by statute and beyond the jurisdiction of the sentencing
court, as well as those disproportionate to the offense involved"). For a discussion of the his-
torical background of the American rejection of torture, see infra Part II.B.3.
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879). The Court has regularly proclaimed that tor-
ture, the infliction of lingering and excruciating pain, is out of bounds, even where capital pun-
ishment is warranted. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) ("Punishments are cruel
when they involve torture or a lingering death . .. ."); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (referencing
Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) ("Pro-
hibition against the wanton infliction of pain has come into our law from the [English] Bill of
Rights of 1688 [sic]."); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 370 (1910) (quoting Kemmler, 136
U.S. at 447).
As applied to capital cases, the boundaries of the prohibition on torture have allowed sub-
stantial pain to accompany execution, but nothing approaching the impositions proposed by
Professor Dershowitz. Compare Gray v. Lucas, 463 U.S. 1237, 1239-40 (1983) (Burger, C.J., con-
curring in denial of certiorari) (agreeing with the decision of the court of appeals that death by
cyanide is not so different from other methods of constitutional execution), with id. at 1240-42
(Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (describing gruesome and painful death by
cyanide gas that can extend over several minutes). See generally Gomez v. United States Dist.
Ct., 503 U.S. 653, 655-56 (1992) (StevensJ., dissenting from vacation of stay) (describing pain-
ful death from cyanide gas, which extended over ten minutes); Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S.
Nov. 2003]
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sally conceded to be outside the scope of legitimate punishment,
even for the most heinous of crimes.
Professor Dershowitz, however, citing Ingraham v. Wright,8 takes
the position that this prohibition applies only to "punishment," and
that the effort to extract information where no judicially imposed
punishment is contemplated lies outside of the prohibition.,9 Ingra-
ham involved a challenge to the imposition of corporal punishment
on students in the Dade County, Florida, school system. The pun-
ishment was referred to as "paddling," but included assaults compris-
ing twenty to fifty blows with a wooden slat which on occasion left the
1080, 1087-89 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (describing electrocu-
tion as a painful experience lasting several minutes).
Professor Dershowitz asks rhetorically, "What moral principle could justify the death penalty
for past individual murders and at the same time condemn nonlethal torture to prevent future
mass murders?" WHY TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 11, at 148. The answer, one supposes, is
the moral principle embedded in the Eighth Amendment.
17 See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002) (holding that shackling in a painful position
at a "hitching post" for extended time is unconstitutional because "[t]he unnecessary and wan-
ton infliction of pain ... constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment" (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986))); Helling v. McKinney, 509
U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (holding that conditions of prison confinement that are likely to cause seri-
ous illness and needless suffering violate the Eighth Amendment); Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992) (reaffirming, in a case involving beating by prison guards, the "general re-
quirement" that the Eighth Amendment proscribes "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain"
or torture, even when no serious physical injury eventuates); Estele, 429 U.S. at 104 (1976)
(holding that the denial of medical care for "serious medical needs" likely to result in substan-
tial pain or suffering violates the Eighth Amendment because "unnecessary and wanton inflic-
tion of pain" is inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976))); cf. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 26 (Thomas,J., dissenting) (explaining that
the state cannot inflict serious agony, whether physical or not, without cause); Weems, 217 U.S.
at 372-73 (holding that sentencing defendant to labor under painful conditions violated Eighth
Amendment, which was motivated by Framers' suspicion that "power might be tempted to cru-
elty"); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting) ("That [cruel and un-
usual] designation ... is usually applied to punishments which inflict torture, such as the rack,
the thumbscrew, the iron boot, the stretching of limbs and the like, which are attended with
acute pain and suffering.").
To violate the Eighth Amendment, the imposition in question must be the result of either
intent or deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (apply-
ing "deliberate indifference" requirement to the conduct of prison officials accused of failing to
protect inmate from assaults by other inmates). Infliction of pain is, of course, entirely in-
tended in the situations of which Professor Dershowitz writes.
18 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
19 Professor Dershowitz's approach thus has echoes of the torture prialable, established by the
French legal system during the Ancien Rfigime, in which torture was applied after criminal con-
viction to gain the names of accomplices. SeeJOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF
PROOF: EUROPE AND ENGLAND IN THE ANCIEN REGIME 16-17 (1977); EDWARD PETERS, TORTURE
66 (1985). The torture prialable was retained even after abolition of the torture priparatoire, which
sought to obtain confessions. See id. at 73; see also LANGBEIN, supra at 16-17 ("In the French
sources ordinary judicial torture is known as torture priparatoire, as opposed to this torture of a
convict, so-called torture prialable, literally 'preliminary torture' in the sense of being preliminary
to the execution of a capital sentence.").
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recipients incapacitated and in need of medical treatment.20 None-
theless, a five-member majority of the Court found the punishments
in question to be outside of the ambit of the Eighth Amendment,
construing the ban on "cruel and unusual punishment" to apply only
to punishment imposed as part of the criminal process.
So, too, the most recent Supreme Court pronouncements lend
support to Professor Dershowitz's claim that the protection against
self-incrimination bars the use of coerced disclosures at trial, rather
than the coercion itself. While earlier language in the Supreme
Court seemed to establish a right against coercive interrogations
rooted in the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause, a majority
of the Court in Chavez v. Martinez22 refused to entertain an action for
damages based on a violation of the self-incrimination right on behalf
of a plaintiff who had been interrogated for forty-five minutes while
screaming in pain and awaiting medical treatment after being shot in
the face by the police. Justice Thomas's opinion, joined on this point
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and O'Connor, found
no violation of the self-incrimination right because the plaintiff was
never brought to trial on any criminal charge. According to Justice
Thomas's opinion:
Statements compelled by police interrogations of course may not be used
against a defendant at trial, but it is not until their use in a criminal case
that a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause occurs. The text of the
Self-Incrimination Clause simply cannot support the... view that the
mere use of compulsive questioning, without more, violates the Constitu-
21tion.
Notwithstanding a vigorous dissent by Justice Kennedy, joined by jus-
tices Stevens and Ginsburg, the case lends support to Professor Der-
showitz's position on self-incrimination.24
20 See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 656-57 (noting that one of the plaintiffs received more than
twenty blows, required medical care, and could not return to school for several days; a second
plaintiff could not use one of his arms for a week); id. at 688 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that
another student received fifty blows).
21 In this respect Ingraham is probably good law. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393
n.6 (1989) (citing Ingraham for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment standard applies
"only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated
with criminal prosecutions"); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
199 n.6 (1989) (same); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318 (1986) (same); Revere v. Mass. Gen.
Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (same); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, n.16 (1979) (citing
Ingraham and United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 317-18 (1946), for the same proposition).
But cf Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) (applying Eighth Amendment to in remt civil
forfeiture proceeding and therefore to "remedial goals" beyond the criminal context).
123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003).
23 Id. at 2001 (citations omitted).
24 Justice Souter concurred in the judgment on the self-incrimination claim, joined by Jus-
tice Breyer, to provide a majority. His opinion began by stating, in his view:
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Professor Dershowitz concludes that the only protections the Con-
stitution imposes on nonpunitive government cruelty in and of itself
are procedural, and may be met by issuance of a "torture warrant" on
a proper showing of probable cause. If his reading of the Fifth and
Eighth Amendments exhausts constitutional constraints, a gaping
hole opens in constitutional protections against tyranny: a govern-
ment seeking to cow the citizenry need only dispense with prosecu-
tion entirely and administer physical sanctions directly to disfavored
individuals on "probable cause."
Not all citizens would be subject to "probable cause," of course,
but the threat would be sufficient to intimidate persons who associate
with potential suspects. This, of course, cannot be the law, and read
carefully, the governing cases make the point pellucid.
2. The Limitations of the Dershowitz Analysis
a. The Eighth Amendment, Ingraham v. Wright, and Bodily Integrity
While, as Professor Dershowitz notes, Ingraham v. Wright found the
Eighth Amendment inapplicable to assaults on students, the case also
adopted the proposition that bodily integrity is a liberty interest pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause. Justice Powell's further discussion
focused on the procedures required for the imposition of paddling,
because the grant of certiorari had excluded the plaintiffs' substan-
tive due process claim. 5 The procedural due process analysis that fol-
[Tihe text of the Fifth Amendment (applied here under the doctrine of Fourteenth
Amendment incorporation) focuses on courtroom use of a criminal defendant's com-
pelled, self-incriminating testimony .... Martinez has offered no reason to believe that
the guarantee has been ineffective in all or many of those circumstances in which its -,in-
dication has depended on excluding testimonial admissions or barring penalties.
Id. at 2006-07 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). Souter did not indicate whether an
injunctive action might be proper, or what result would be obtained if a showing were made.
25 The Court specifically refused to address the contention that substantive due process
barred punishments as to students that would be unconstitutional as to convicted criminals. See
Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 659 n.12. Perhaps this was an effort to avoid the furor that accompanied
the substantive due process discussion of abortion, which was raging at the time. Current law,
however, seems to have accepted Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), as part of the constitutional
canon. See Seth F. Kreimer, The Second Time as Tragedy: The Assisted Suicide Cases and the Heritage
of Roe v. Wade, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 863, 867 (1997) (observing that all members of the
Court in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), accepted the vitality of the abortion
right). The recent majority in Lawrence v. Texas was remarkably aggressive in its citation of the
abortion cases as binding precedent. 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481 (2003) (describing Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), as having affirmed "the substantive force of the liberty pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause"); id. at 2480, 2483 (providing other citations to Casey).
Likewise, notwithstanding the periodic rumblings of dissatisfaction by Justices Thomas and
Scalia, there is also unanimity that the Due Process Clause bears a substantive content, however
contested its precise boundaries may be. See, e.g., Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481; Chavez, 123 S. Ct.
1994; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1520 (2003) ("Despite the
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lowed was not a blanket grant of deference to executive decisions to
deploy physical force, but rather a tightly focused (not to say idiosyn-
cratic) set of reasoning. It was predicated on both the teacher's
common law privilege of "moderate correction" and on a concern for
the local educational autonomy. Justice White's dissent for himself
and Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, in addition to dis-
agreeing with Justice Powell's analysis of the Eighth Amendment is-
sues suggested-without contradiction-that given the recognition of
a liberty interest in bodily autonomy, review of physical assaults by
school officials and other executive officers could take place under
the rubric of substantive due process. 6 Such, indeed, has been the
subsequent development over the last generation.
Despite its professed hesitance to make the Constitution a "font of
tort law," the Supreme Court has recognized that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "was intended to prevent gov-
ernment... 'from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an instru-
ment of oppression,'-2 7 and has enunciated a series of constitutional
limits on the capacity of government to deploy force against the bod-
ies of the citizenry. In law enforcement, the Fourth Amendment has
been held to bar police from either employing excessive force in car-
rying out arrests even with probable cause,2 8 or engaging in brutally
invasive searches for evidence even with a warrant.9 For convicted
prisoners, the Eighth Amendment has been held to bar guards from
engaging in calculated brutality and to forbid the state from denying
necessities of a safe and minimally decent existence. ° In other cus-
broad discretion that States possess with respect to the imposition of criminal penalties and pu-
nitive damages, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion imposes substantive limits on that discretion." (quoting Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman
Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433 (2001))); Glucksbeg, 521 U.S. 702.
26 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 669 n.5 (White,J., dissenting).
27 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (quoting Collins v. City of
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992) (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. of
Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348
(1986)))).
28 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395
(1989) (setting forth objective reasonableness test for measuring excessive force); Brower v.
County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989) (subjecting police roadblock to Fourth Amendment re-
quirements because intentional restraint on citizen's freedom of movement constituted sei-
zure).
29 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
30 See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002) (classifying punishment by use of a hitching
post as cruel and unusual); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-34 (1994) (condemning fail-
ure to protect against inmate beatings); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993) (holding that
a prisoner claiming to have suffered cruel and unusual punishment by being exposed to envi-
ronmental tobacco smoke had stated an Eighth Amendment claim); Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 10-11 (1992) (reaffirming earlier holdings that malicious and excessive force is cruel
and unusual punishment); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) (holding that shooting of an
inmate during a prison riot did not violate Eighth Amendment because it was part of a good
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todial settings, the Constitution similarly bars officials from physical
assault and the denial of minimal standards of decent treatment.
3
Indeed, actions against officials to enforce standards of minimum de-
cency came to represent the largest part of the civil constitutional
caseload of lower federal courts during the 1990s.
3
2
In the last decade, the Court has also come to enunciate a more
general protection: if not covered by a specific constitutional con-
straint, the Court has held that due process substantively protects
against physical abuses that "shock the conscience of the Court."
This line of cases originates in Rochin v. California, which began when
Los Angeles deputy sheriffs pursued a tip that Antonio Rochin had
been dealing narcotics. They burst into his apartment and observed
two suspicious capsules on the nightstand beside the bed, on which
Rochin lay partly undressed. When Rochin swallowed the capsules,
the deputies handcuffed him and conveyed him to a hospital where
"[a] t the direction of one of the officers a doctor forced an emetic so-
lution through a tube into Rochin's stomach against his will."3  Ro-
chin vomited, revealing the suspect capsules; over Rochin's objection,
the capsules and the morphine they contained were introduced into
evidence at his subsequent trial.
Justice Frankfurter, writing for six members of the Court, found
this course of conduct violated the demands of due process, which
guarantee "respect for those personal immunities which... are 'so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental... or are implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty. '"'" Observing that due process requires the state to "respect cer-
faith effort to restore security); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (finding denial of
medical care unconstitutional).
s1 As the Court summarized these cases in Collins:
We have held, for example, that apart from the protection against cruel and unusual
punishment provided by the Eighth Amendment, cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978),
the Due Process Clause of its own force requires that conditions of confinement satisfy
certain minimal standards for pretrial detainees, see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535,
n.16, 545 (1979), for persons in mental institutions, Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,
315-316 (1982), for convicted felons, Turnerv. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94-99 (1987), and for
persons under arrest, see Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 244-245
(1983).
503 U.S. at 127. See also West v. Atkins, where Justice Scalia explains:
[A] physician who acts on behalf of the State to provide needed medical attention to a
person involuntarily in state custody (in prison or elsewhere) and prevented from other-
wise obtaining it, and who causes physical harm to such a person by deliberate indiffer-
ence, violates the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against the deprivation of liberty
without due process.
487 U.S. 42, 58 (1988) (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment).
32 See Kreimer, Dark Matter, supra note 1, at 470-71 (providing detailed statistical breakdown
of the bases for constitutional claims).
33 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 166 (1952).
Id. at 169 (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
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tain decencies of civilized conduct," the opinion declared of Mr. Ro-
chin's treatment at the hands of the deputies:
This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking into the
privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove
what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's contents-this
course of proceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence is
bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are methods too close• . . 35
to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.
While the issue before the Court in Rochin was the use of evidence
in a criminal prosecution, it rapidly became clear that the shock to
the Court's conscience arose from the "coercion, violence or brutality
involved. 6 When Justice Powell canvassed the scope ofto the per-son" ole . njsiePwl nasdte o o
constitutional protection from physical assault in Ingraham v. Wright,
he included Rochin as support for the historic pedigree of that right.
37
There followed a quarter-century-long struggle over the legitimacy of
substantive due process as a rubric for judicial review, swirling in
large measure around the debate over the constitutional status of
abortion. Throughout this period, opinions continued to cite Rochin
for the proposition that deliberate use of force that "shocks the con-
science" violates constitutional constraints. 38  By the end of the cen-
tury, as the abortion debate stabilized, Rochin was being cited as a key-
stone in the constitutional protection of bodily integrity against
arbitrary invasion.39
3 Id. at 172. See id. at 173 ("It would be a stultification of the responsibility which the course
of constitutional history has cast upon this Court to hold that in order to convict a man the po-
lice cannot extract by force what is in his mind but can extract what is in his stomach.").
Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 133 (1954); see also Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432,
435 (1957) (deciding that an involuntary blood test was not sufficiently "brutal" or "offensive"
to invoke Rochin); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (holding that an involuntary
blood test to measure blood-alcohol level is reasonable).
37 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977).
See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring) ("Because our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea of physical
freedom and self-determination, the Court has often deemed state incursions into the body re-
pugnant to the interests protected by the Due Process Clause."); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 58
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (construing prisoner's
claim as one premised on substantive due process); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)
(stating that in the context of forceful prison security measures, conduct that violates the Four-
teenth Amendment also violates the Eighth Amendment). See alsoJohnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d
1028, 1032 (2d Cir. 1973) ("Rochin ... must stand for the proposition that, quite apart from any
'specific' of the Bill of Rights, application of undue force by law enforcement officers deprives a
suspect of liberty without due process of law.").
9 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (recognizing "bodily integ-
rity" as included in liberty "specially protected" by due process); id. at 777 (Souter, J., concur-
ring in the judgment) (same); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (citing
Rochin to argue that the Constitution places limits on a state's right to interfere with bodily in-
tegrity); id. at 915 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same); id. at 927
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part)
(same).
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In County of Sacramento v. Lewis, the Court announced a general
approach to the problem of executive abuse of force. Relying on Ro-
chin, the Court held that in circumstances covered by neither the
Fourth Amendment nor the Eighth Amendment, the Due Process
Clause bars executive officials "from abusing [their] power or em-
ploying it as an instrument of oppression" in a fashion that "shocks
the conscience of the court. '4  Thus today, notwithstanding the fact
that the Eighth Amendment does not constrain school teachers, a
student like the plaintiff in Ingraham v. Wright, having sustained inca-
pacitating injury caused by subjection to twenty "licks" with a wooden
paddle at the hands of a public school teacher, would have a good
cause of action against his assailant under substantive due process
theory.4'
b. Coercive Interrogation
Rochin, it will be recalled, grounded its analysis in an analogy to
the values of the Self-Incrimination Clause: the state's assault was "too
close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentia-
tion."42 In Chavez v. Martinez,3 while a majority of the Court denied
40 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (citations omitted). In the con-
text of a high-speed police chase, the Court held that conduct short of an "intent to harm sus-
pects physically" would not "shock the conscience," though it left open the scope of "con-
science-shocking" conduct in other circumstances. Id. at 854. See also United States v. Lanier,
520 U.S. 259, 262 (1997) (reversing dismissal of civil rights prosecution of a state judge who
sexually assaulted and orally raped litigants and employees, where trial court correctly charged
that physical assault would violate Constitution if the conduct involved "physical force, mental
coercion, bodily injury or emotional damage which is shocking to one's consci[ence]").
41 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 657, 674. See, e.g., Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239
F.3d 246, 251-52 (2d Cir. 2001) (concluding that gym teacher's disciplinary response of drag-
ging student across the floor by neck and slamming student's head against bleachers stated a
substantive due process claim); Neal v. Fulton County Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1071 (lth
Cir. 2000) (holding that corporal punishment by football coach that resulted in destruction of a
student's eye stated a substantive due process claim); P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1304 (9th Cir.
1996) (holding that school principal's conduct in hitting one student in the mouth, grabbing
and squeezing the student's neck, punching a second student in the chest, and throwing a third
student headfirst into lockers was corporal punishment actionable as a substantive due process
claim); Metzger v. Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 519-20 (3d Cir. 1988) (concluding that "discipline"
resulting in lacerations to a student's lower lip, a broken nose, fractured teeth and other inju-
ries requiring hospitalization stated violation of substantive due process); Garcia v. Miera, 817
F.2d 650, 658 (10th Cir. 1987) (finding principal's motion for summary judgment on substan-
tive due process inappropriate where nine-year-old student was left with deep bruises, bleeding,
and permanent scar after paddling); Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 942 (10th Cir. 1982)
(upholding injunction against school's use of a disciplinary action nicknamed the "hair dance"
in which a school employee would "grab one of the student's arms and clutch the boy's hair
with his other hand"); Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 1980) (reversing dismissal of
claim brought by a student who spent ten days hospitalized with tissue damage from spanking
with rubber paddle).
42 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
43 123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003).
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the application of the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause
to coercive interrogation simplicter, the opinions in that case simul-
taneously made clear that the powers of the government to inflict in-
jury in the search for information are constrained by substantive due
process.
Chavez was argued a little over a year after the September 11 at-
tacks, against the backdrop of the ongoing "war on terror." The brief
for the petitioner, seeking to exonerate the police officer who per-
sisted in questioning the wounded and screaming suspect, invoked
the image of an official questioning a "suspect [who] has been ar-
rested for kidnaping [sic] a small child who cannot survive without
immediate adult intervention. The child is being hidden somewhere,
and time is running out on his life," and invited the Court to refer to
Professor Dershowitz's analysis.44 One amicus brief invited the Court
to consider issues of "national security" in limiting the rights of those
subject to interrogation.4  The Solicitor General, on behalf of the
United States as amicus curiae, argued for "breathing space" needed
"for law enforcement to confront imminent threats," putting before
the Court the picture of police seeking "life-saving information" from
a suspect regarding a "bomb... about to explode," and inviting the
Court to approve such measures as "grabbing of the throat," pointing
a gun at the suspect's temple, and threatening to "knock [the sus-
pect's] remaining teeth out of his mouth if he remained silent.
46
The Court pointedly declined these invitations. Five of the six
opinions in the case renounced the position that torture to obtain
relevant information is a constitutionally acceptable law enforcement
technique if the information is not introduced at trial.4  In deciding
44 Brief for the Petitioner at 27 n.8, Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003) (No. 01-1444)
(citing WHY TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 11, at 135, 247 n.3) (encouraging Court to interpret
Leon v. Wainwright, 734 F.2d 770 (1lth Cir. 1984), as did Dershowitz, to admit statements made
sufficiently subsequent to an incident of torture).
45 Brief of Amici Curiae 50 California Cities in Favor of Petitioner and Reversal at 28, Chavez
(No. 01-1444).
46 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 24-25, 21, 29,
Chavez (No. 01-1444). See Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 7, Chavez, (No. 01-1444) (invoking
the "bomb is about to explode"). See also Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Chavez, (No. 01-
1444), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argumenttranscripts/
("QUESTION: [L]et's assume . .. you think he's going to blow up the World Trade Center. I
suppose if... we have.., this necessity exception ... you could beat him with a rubber hose.").
Both the United States and the Petitioner cited Justice Marshall's dissent in New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 686 (1984), for the proposition that, "[i]f a bomb is about to ex-
plode ... the police are free to interrogate suspects without advising them of their constitu-
tional rights." Of course, the United States and the Petitioner argued that the police were free
to do much more.
47 Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2004 (Thomas, J., holding unclear) ("Our views on the proper scope
of the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause do not mean that police torture or other
abuse that results in a confession is constitutionally permissible so long as the statements are
not used at trial . .. ."); id. at 2010 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
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this, they followed established law. Many cases condemning physical
abuse in the search for evidence as unconstitutional involved the in-
validation of convictions obtained on the basis of extorted confes-
sions. 8 But there is sound precedent, as well, for the proposition that
such physical abuse, in and of itself, violates the mandates of the Due
Process Clause. Almost half a century ago, the Supreme Court up-
held the criminal conviction of special police who physically abused a
series of suspects in the effort to obtain both confessions and evi-
dence against alleged accomplices. The Court held that the physical
(concluding that the law is clear that "an attempt to obtain an involuntary confession from a
prisoner by torturous methods .... [is the] type of brutal police conduct [that] constitutes an
immediate deprivation of the prisoner's constitutionally protected interest in liberty"); id. at
2016 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[U]se of torture or its equiva-
lent in an attempt to induce a statement violates an individual's fundamental right to liberty of
the person."); id. at 2019 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Ste-
vens on "torturous methods" and characterizing the type of procedure to be avoided by quoting
4J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251, 827 (1923), that "[ilt is far pleasanter to sit comfortably in the
shade rubbing red pepper into a poor devil's eyes than to go about in the sun hunting up evi-
dence"). Justice Souter, joined by Justice Breyer, was more measured in his comments, con-
cluding thatJustice Stevens had shown that Martinez had set forth a 'serious argument" that the
police conduct was unconstitutionally "outrageous." Id. at 2007-08 (Souter, J., concurring in
the judgment). Justice Scalia, who joined Justice Thomas's opinion, filed a separate opinion
focusing on a procedural objection to the outcome of the case. Id. at 2008 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part in the judgment). Cf McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 41 (2002) (distinguishing "the
physical torture against which the Constitution clearly protects" from "de minimus harms against
which it does not").
48 The first in this line was Brown v. Misissippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281-82 (1936), which involved
convictions based on confessions resulting from investigations in which one defendant was "tied
to a tree and whipped" and two others were "made to strip and they were laid over chairs and
their backs were cut to pieces with a leather strap with buckles on it." See, e.g., Beecher v. Ala-
bama, 389 U.S. 35, 36 (1967) (recounting police chief's threat to suspect, "If you don't tell the
truth I am going to kill you," and officer's subsequent firing of rifle next to suspect's ear);
Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 709-10 (1967) (describing suspect's arrest without probable cause
and interrogation for nine days with little food or sleep); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 435, 439-
40 n.3 (1961) (giving account of mentally retarded youth interrogated incommunicado for a
week "during which time he was frequently ill, fainted several times, vomited blood on the floor
of the police station and was twice taken to the hospital on a stretcher"); Leyra v. Denno, 347
U.S. 556, 558-61 (1954) (invalidating conviction where sleep-deprived suspect confessed after
being questioned by state psychiatrist who offered to treat suspect's "acutely painful attack of
sinus"); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 403 (1945) (noting that defendant was held naked
for three hours and questioned in hotel room for ten hours); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S.
143, 150-51 (1944) (noting that defendant was questioned for thirty-six straight hours without
sleep); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 555 (1942) (explaining that defendant was moved "by night
and day to strange towns, [told] of threats of mob violence, and question[ed] continuously"
before giving confession); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 230 (1941) (noting that defen-
dant was held incommunicado, slapped and allegedly beaten, leaving both ears swollen); White
v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530, 532-33 (1940) (explaining that armed Texas Rangers took defendant
out of jail and into the woods for interrogation where they allegedly whipped him); Chambers
v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1940) (describing arrest of defendants, black tenant farmers,
without warrants and their interrogations "under circumstances calculated to break the strong-
est nerves and the stoutest resistance").
[Vol. 6:2
CONSTFITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON TORTURE
abuse itself constituted a deprivation of constitutional rights under
color of law.49
All of the Justices in Chavez accepted the proposition, based in Ro-
chin and County of Sacramento v. Lewis, that egregious physical abuse in
police questioning that "shocks the conscience" of the court would
violate the substantive requirements of the Due Process Clause." The
Justices splintered, however, on whether the actions of Officer Chavez
rose (or sank) to that level of egregiousness. Justice Thomas, joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, would have relied on an
absence of evidence that Officer Chavez "acted with a purpose to
harm Martinez," interfered with his treatment, or "exacerbated [his]
injuries or prolonged his stay in the hospital" along with the legiti-
mate "need to investigate" the circumstances of the shooting to con-
clude that no substantive due process violation had been alleged.5
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, thought it
equally plain that because "the suspect thought his treatment would
be delayed, and thus his pain and condition worsened, by refusal to
answer questions," there was a clear constitutional violation; "no rea-
sonable police officer would believe that the law ermitted him to
prolong or increase pain to obtain a statement."'  Justice Souter,
joined by Justice Breyer, filed a brief and cryptic opinion for the
Court stating that there was a "serious argument" in support of that
claim, but that whether the actions were indeed conscience-shocking
should be resolved on remand.5
49 Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 101 (1951) ("[W]here police take matters in their
own hands, seize victims, beat and pound them until they confess, there cannot be the slightest
doubt that the police have deprived the victim of a right under the Constitution."). See United
States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 793 & n.6 (1966) (holding that police officers who assaulted, shot,
and killed civil rights workers violated due process rights, and quoting Williams on "beat[ing]
and poundfingi until they confess"); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (holding that
forcing a suspect to vomit evidence is unconstitutional). As the Court set forth the facts in Wil-
iams.
A rubber hose, a pistol, a blunt instrument, a sash cord and other implements were used
in the project. One man was forced to look at a bright light for fifteen minutes; when he
was blinded, he was repeatedly hit with a rubber hose and a sash cord and finally
knocked to the floor. Another was knocked from a chair and hit in the stomach again
and again. He was put back in the chair and the procedure was repeated. One was
backed against the wall and jammed in the chest with a club. Each was beaten, threat-
ened, and unmercifully punished for several hours until he confessed.
341 U.S. at 98-99.
50 Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2005 (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor and Scalia,
JJ.); id. at 2008 (Souter, J.,joined by Breyer,J.); idat 2011 (Stevens,J.); id. at 2016 (KennedyJ.,
joined by Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ.) (Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, "use of torture or its equivalent in an attempt to induce a statement violates an
individual's fundamental right to liberty of the person." (citing Rochin, 342 U.S. at 165)).
51 Id. at 2005 (Thomas, J., holding unclear).
5 Id. at 2017-18 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
53 Id. at 2008 (Souter,J., opinion of the court on this point). Justice O'Connor's position on
this issue does not seem to be recorded.
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In light of this evolution, how should we approach the question of
"torture warrants"? Whatever else may be true, it appears that Profes-
sor Dershowitz's proceduralist position is no longer tenable. Al-
though neither the Self-Incrimination Clause nor the Eighth
Amendment apply by their own force to investigatory torture, brutal
inquisition violates the Constitution as a substantive matter if its bru-
tality "shocks the conscience of the court."54 This conclusion, how-
ever, simply sets the terms of further discussion, for it does not an-
swer the question of exactly what level or type of brutality will shock
the judicial conscience. Professor Dershowitz's proposed torture is
brutal, and would be undertaken with a "purpose to harm"-the ab-
sence of which underpinned the Thomas opinion's exoneration of
Officer Chavez. But will a claim of sufficiently compelling circum-
stances assuage brutality's shock? Conversely, the recurrent accounts
of "stress and duress" techniques deployed by United States interro-
gators in the "war on terror" fall short of Dershowitz's proposed
needle under the fingernails, and only two Justices fully joined justice
Kennedy's position in Chavez that "no reasonable police officer would
[have] believe[d] that the law permitted him to prolong or increase
pain to obtain a statement., 51 Would what is referred to by some
former American officials as "torture lite"56 shock the judicial con-
science? An answer to these questions requires further investigation
into the contours of the judicial conscience.
III. THE CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT
A. What's Wrong with the Rack and the Screw?
In sounding the depths of the judicial conscience that finds "the
rack and the screw" repugnant, it is worth beginning with the basis
for that repugnance. Torture is alien to our Constitution both be-
In the event on remand, the Ninth Circuit was equally abrupt, but more emphatic, in Marti-
nez v. City of Oxnard, 337 F.3d 1091, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003), holding tersely that the plaintiff's
claim was viable because "[a] clearly established right, fundamental to ordered liberty, is free-
dom from coercive police interrogation."
54 Professor Dershowitz acknowledges the "shocks the conscience" constraint of Rochin, WHY
TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 11, at 135, 247-49, but concludes that only procedural protec-
tions are required in the case of "a terrorist suspected of refusing to disclose information neces-
sary to prevent a terrorist attack." His citation for this proposition, Leon v. Wainwright, 734
F.2d 770 (11th Cir. 1984), is an odd one, since Leon appears to acknowledge that a constitu-
tional violation occurred when police choked a kidnapper to determine the location of the kid-
nap victim, but determined that the violation had been dissipated by the passage of time and
advice of his rights between the abuse and a subsequent confession.
5 Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2017-18 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part,
joined by Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ.).
56 See, e.g., Duncan Campbell, US Interrogators Turn to "Torture Lite," GUARDIAN (London),
Jan. 25, 2003, at 17 (quoting former U.S. Navy intelligence officer).
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cause it impinges on bodily integrity, and because it assaults the
autonomy and dignity of the victim.
1. Bodily Integrity
Torture in the form that Professor Dershowitz contemplates in-
volves an assault on the body. 7 Yet from the early days of the Repub-
lic, physical security against government has been a defining charac-
teristic of the American constitutional system; protection against
physical assault by their rulers is one of the hallmarks of free people.
The Fourth Amendment protects the "person" against unreasonable
searches and seizures; the protection of "liberty" against deprivation
without due process builds on Blackstone's definition of liberty as in-
cluding personal security.
58
This concern for bodily integrity draws force as well from the
background of the Thirteenth Amendment's ban on slavery. In
American law before the Civil War, one of the defining differences
between slavery and other domestic relations was precisely that the
body of the slave was subject to the master's "uncontrolled authority";
physical assault could yield no legal redress. Indeed, the standard
57 Note that some forms of "stress and duress" involve sensory deprivation, rather than sen-
sory assaults.
58 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 661, 673 n.41 (1977) ("Blackstone catalogued among
the 'absolute rights of individuals' the right 'to security from the corporal insults of menaces,
assaults, beating, and wounding... .'" (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 134)).
59 See, e.g., State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 266, 268 (1829) (recognizing "absolute" au-
thority of master over the slave's body); Commonwealth v. Turner, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 678 (1827)
(sustaining master's demurrer to indictment on charge of beating his slave); ANDREW FEDE,
PEOPLE WITHOUT RIGHTS: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE LAW OF SLAVERY
IN THE U.S. SOUTH 3, 10-11 (Harold M. Hyman ed., 1992) ("[T]he logic of slave law was the
logic of absolute legal oppression of one person over another.").
The master's authority did not extend to killing the slave. See, e.g., State v. Will, 18 N.C. (1
Dev. & Bat.) 121, 126-31, 134, 172 (1834) (holding that slave's death at master's hand, absent
malice, was not murder but was a "felonious" homicide); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Anne F.
Jacobs, The "Law Only as an Enemy": The Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness Through the Colonial
and Antebellum Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70 N.C. L. REV. 969, 1032-35 (1992) (providing exam-
ples of prosecutions and convictions for the killing of slaves by masters or overseers). Some
states by statute prohibited "cruel and unusual" punishments of slaves. See, e.g., Wilson v. State,
29 Tex. 240, 245-46 (1867) (citing Texas statute under which "abuse or cruel treatment" of
slave leading to death was murder); Kelly v. State, 11 Miss. (3 S. & M.) 518, 526 (1844) ("[T]he
master or any other person entitled to the service of the slave shall not inflict upon such slave
cruel or unusual punishment, under the penalty, upon conviction thereof, of a fine of five hun-
dred dollars."); Turnipseed v. State, 6 Ala. 664, 665 (1844) (citing Alabama penal code section
providing that "[n]o cruel or unusual punishment shall be inflicted on any slave"). Whipping,
however, was the normal mode of punishment on plantations, LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 85-87 (1993), and for antebellum antislavery forces,
"whipping symbolically condensed the evils of tyranny and barbarism." MICHAEL MERANZE,
LABORATORIES OF VIRTUE: PUNISHMENT, REVOLUTION, AND AUTHORITY IN PHILADELPHIA, 1760-
1835, at 296 (1996).
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form of a legal suit for freedom was an action for battery against the
purported master.60 A constitutional prohibition of slavery brings
with it a presumption that the bodies of citizens are subject to neither
the "uncontrolled authority" of the state nor that of any private party.
As Justice O'Connor has observed, "Because our notions of liberty are
inextricably entwined with our idea of physical freedom and self-
determination, the Court has often deemed state incursions into the
body repugnant to the interests protected by the Due Process
Clause." °
2. Pain, Suffering, and Autonomy: The Meaning of Torture
Torture, of course, is not a mere infringement on bodily integrity.
It is an infringement designed to produce excruciating pain. Both
the Eighth Amendment's strictures against cruel punishment and the
antitorture background of the Self-Incrimination Clause bespeak hos-
tility toward such practices. Justice Kennedy in Chavez took the posi-
tion that "no reasonable police officer would believe that the law
permitted him to prolong or increase pain to obtain a statement."
62
So, too, in Glucksberg, Justice Stevens would have held that "[a]voiding
60 See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (dismissing, for want of
diversity jurisdiction, slave's suit for battery committed by master).
61 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990) (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
See also Sell v. United States 123 S. Ct. 2174, 2182 (2003) (reiterating that "involuntary medical
treatment raises questions of clear constitutional importance" under the Due Process Clause);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) ("'[L]iberty' specially protected by the Due
Process Clause includes the right[] to ... bodily integrity ...."); Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) ("It is settled now.., that the Constitution places limits on a State's
right to interfere with a person's most basic decisions about.., bodily integrity."); Riggins v.
Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992) (holding Due Process prevents a person detained for trial
from being forced to take antipsychotic drugs "absent a finding of overriding justification and a
determination of medical appropriateness"); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-79 (inferring "liberty in-
terest" to refuse "unwanted" medical care from prior cases under the Due Process Clause);
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-23 (1990) (establishing prisoner's due process right
to be free from forced antipsychotic drug therapy absent justification); United States v. Stanley,
483 U.S. 669, 710 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[O]ur
Constitution's promise of due process of law guarantees" at least compensation for violations of
the principle stated by the Nuremberg Military Tribunals "that the 'voluntary consent of the
human subject is absolutely essential.., to satisfy moral, ethical and legal concepts.'" (citation
omitted)); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (forbidding brutally invasive surgical search au-
thorized by warrant); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982) (recognizing Due Process
Clause protects "right to freedom from bodily restraint" that survives involuntary commitment
to state institution for the mentally retarded); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966)
("The integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value of our society."); Union Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (refusing court-compelled medical examination of
plaintiff upon pretrial application by defendant).
62 Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994, 2018 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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intolerable pain" was a virtually indefeasible individual right,6' and
Justices O'Connor, Ginsberg, and Breyer approved the prohibition
on assisted suicide at issue only because state law permitted palliative
interventions sufficient to avoid agony.64
This perception is not a new one. Even before the Court applied
the Fifth Amendment's protections against self-incrimination to the
states, torture to obtain criminal convictions was outside of the moral
universe delineated by the Constitution under the fundamentals of
"ordered liberty"; "[t] he rack and torture chamber may not be substi-
tuted for the witness stand."65 Likewise, it has been clear for over a
century that one of the core elements of the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is its bar of the
imposition of torture or lingering death. 6 Almost three decades ago,
in Estelle v. Gamble, the Court concluded that "deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs of prisoners" can impose constitutionally
,67impermissible "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." One of
the examples cited by the Court in Estelle as "cruel and unusual pun-
ishment" was the refusal to administer a prescribed pain killer to
prisoners after surgery.68 If there are physical sensations that cannot
legitimately be inflicted on prisoners in retaliation for even the most
heinous of crimes, presumably the state may not inflict these sensa-
tions on individuals whom it has not even prosecuted. 6  Although the
63 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 745 (Stevens,J, concurring in the judgment) (referring to the right
to assisted suicide when in intolerable pain).
64 Id. at 737 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined in part by Ginsburg and Breyer, A.) (noting
that a patient "experiencing great pain" is not barred from receiving painkilling medicines that
might hasten death); id. at 791 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (observing that laws
under review did not block patient from "avoidance of severe physical pain").
65 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936).
See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890) (reasoning that the Eighth Amendment pro-
hibits Congress from allowing such punishments as "burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking
on the wheel, or the like"); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878) ("[P]unishments of tor-
ture.., are forbidden by that [A] mendment....").
67 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173
(1976)); cf West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 58 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (construing allegations of prisoner subjected to pain by doctor's refusal to
perform surgery as raising a Due Process claim rather than an Eighth Amendment claim).
68 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 n.10.
See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (holding that a person
"injured while being apprehended by police" has due process rights "at least as great" as the
Eighth Amendment rights of a convicted prisoner (citation omitted)); Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982) ("Persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to
more considerate treatment... than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed
to punish."); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979) (distinguishing due process rights of
pretrial detainee from Eighth Amendment rights of sentenced inmate).
Indeed, in his concurrence in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, Justice Frankfurter viewed
this prohibition of willful infliction of great physical cruelty as part of the due process protec-
tion of "'principle[s] of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental.'" 329 U.S. 459, 469-70 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting
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Court may properly hesitate in imposing controversial value choices
under the rubric of due process, the proposition that the government
is constitutionally constrained from intentionally imposing agony on
its subjects does not appear to raise contentious normative issues.
Even in a regime of negative constitutional rights, the Court has
recognized that when the government takes custody of an individual
and renders her helpless, it has a duty to ensure her physical safety
and minimal human needs.7 ' Torture flouts this duty. It inflicts ag-
ony on the helpless; it is at odds with the constitutionally legitimate
role of the state. One of Orwell's final comments in 1984-"If you
want a picture of the future, imagine a boot stamping on a human
face-forever 7 2-repels us precisely because it is the antithesis of the
legitimate relation between the state and those subject to its power.
The pain of torture by design negates the vision of humanity that
lies at the core of a liberal democracy. Justice Kennedy recently set
forth the constitutional importance of the "autonomy of self' in Law-
rence v. Texas.7 Torture seeks to shatter that autonomy. Torture's evil
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). Cf West, 487 U.S. at 58 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that a physician who causes physical harm to a
person involuntarily in state custody violates the Fourteenth Amendment).
70 In a parallel discussion in recent political philosophy, Professor Barry has suggested that
avoiding physical harm is a good candidate for a consensus value because such harm is "delete-
rious from the point of view of a very wide range of conceptions of the good.... [VI irtually any
conception of the good life goes better in the absence of physical injury." BRIAN BARRYJUSTICE
AS IMPARTIALITY 87-88 (1995) (citations omitted). See id. at 25 (noting consensus on "badness
of harm"). See also SISSELA BOK, COMMON VALUES 15-16, 18-19, 30, 57 (1995) (citing duties to
refrain from coercion and violence as minimal values common across cultures); STUART
HAMPSHIRE, INNOCENCE AND EXPERIENCE 90 (1989) (discussing "the great evils of human ex-
perience, re-affirmed in every age ... murder and the destruction of life, imprisonment, en-
slavement.., physical pain and torture"). Cf ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING
AND UNMAKING OF THE WORLD 52 (1985) ("[T] he most essential, aspect of pain is its sheer aver-
siveness. While other sensations have content that may be positive, neutral, or negative, the
very content of pain is itself negation."); MICHAEL WALZER, THICK AND THIN: MORAL ARGUMENT
AT HOME AND ABROAD 10 (1994) (arguing for universal applicability of "negative injunc-
tions... against murder, deceit, torture, oppression, and tyranny" that "respond to other peo-
ple's pain and oppression"); Jeremy Waldron, How to Argue for a Universal Claim, 30 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REv. 305, 305 (1999) (invoking the "standard, predictable abhorrence of torture
in every culture and every society").
71 For such a recognition, see, for example, DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services, which notes:
[W] hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's lib-
erty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide
for his basic human needs-e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable
safety-it transgresses the substantive limits on state action ....
489 U.S 189, 200 (1989), quoted in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 851 (1998).
72 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 220 (The Penguin Group 1981) (1949).
73 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2475 (2003) ("Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes free-
dom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct."). Cf Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) ("The right to think is the beginning of freedom,
and speech must be protected from the government because speech is the beginning of
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extends beyond the physical; extreme pain totally occupies the psy-
chic world; the agony of torture is designed to make choice impossi-
ble.4 Effective torture is intended to induce the subject to abandon
her own volition and become the instrument of the torturer by re-
vealing information. Such government occupation of the self is at
odds with constitutional mandate.75
B. 'Justifiable Violations"?
Not every governmental action that results in pain or impinges on
bodily integrity is barred by the Constitution. A state may uncontro-
versially require smallpox vaccinations in the midst of a threatened
epidemic; a prison guard may concededly use firearms to quell a
prison riot;77 a police officer may unquestionably use appropriate
force to subdue a resistant suspect.78 Can the principles that justify
such actions similarly come to constitutionally justify torture in suffi-
ciently desperate circumstances?
To begin with, it is worth clarifying the precise issue under discus-
sion. It is not the question of whether it is moral for an individual to
thought."); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) ("Our whole constitutional heritage
rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds.").
74 See SCARRY, supra note 70, at 33 ("[I]n serious pain the claims of the body utterly nullify
the claims of the world.").
75 The cases in which the Court has acceded to the state's request to literally override the
will of the subject by involuntary administration of psychotropic medication in order to have
them competent to stand trial have been predicated on a finding that the intervention is both
"essential for the sake of [the prisoner's] own safety or the safety of others" and in the medical
interest of the patient. See Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174, 2183, 2185 (2003) (quoting
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992)). See also id. at 2185 (requiring that the reviewing
court conclude, inter alia, that the drug treatment is in the "patient's best medical interest");
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135 (observing in dictum that the treatment must be "in the inmate's medi-
cal interest") (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990)); Harper, 494 U.S. at 222
n.8 (mandating determination by treating physician that "medication is appropriate").
One must be tremendously careful with such rationales: the Inquisition also sought to
"benefit" its subjects by saving their immortal souls, and doctors have not infrequently con-
vinced themselves that medical benefits coincide with their research agendas or other interests.
Cf United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 686 (1987) (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("In experiments
designed to test the effects of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), the Government of the United
States treated thousands of its citizens as though they were laboratory animals, dosing them with
this dangerous drug without their consent."); GORDON THOMAS, JOURNEY INTO MADNESS: THE
TRUE STORY OF SECRET CIA MIND CONTROL AND MEDICAL ABUSE (1989) (covering stories of pa-
tients in CIA-funded mind-control research programs). They are, in any event, inapplicable to
the case at hand; no one claims that the torture contemplated by Professor Dershowitz is in the
subjects' best interests.
76 See, e.g.,Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding state's mandatory vac-
cinations as valid exercise of police power).
77 See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 326 (1986) (holding that the shooting of a prisoner in
the course of quelling a riot did not violate the Eighth Amendment).
78 SeeTennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (reasoning that "apprehension by the use of
deadly force" is seizure constrained by the Fourth Amendment).
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engage in a particular sort of assault or physical imposition, but
whether the Constitution allows the state to do so. Individuals may
be morally free to engage in a variety of actions-from peremptory
dismissal from employment for political views, to refusal to accord
benefits because of sexual preference, to prayer-that are nonethe-
less barred by the government under our constitutional scheme. The
question, therefore, is not a single abstract moral choice but one of
constitutional law, national identity, and institutional structure.
1. Purposeless Restraints?
One formulation of the demands of substantive due process sug-
gests that it bars "arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints" on
liberty. 9 So, too, there is language in Eighth Amendment precedents
that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause bars "unnecessary
and wanton" infliction of pain. ° Some of the abuses held to violate
the constitutional protections against official abuse have been en-
tirely without public justification.
Judged by this standard, some torture would certainly be unconsti-
tutional. American actions replicating the policies of the former re-
gimes of Greece, Iraq, Uruguay, Uganda, or Argentina would be im-
permissible.82 If an American official were to subject a person to
79 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan,J., dissenting), quoted in Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 752 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring); Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 848-49 (1992) (plurality opinion).
80 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002) ("The unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain... constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment."
(quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319)). This standard of "unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain" has been used repeatedly by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 834 (1994); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) ("[T]he unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain... constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment."); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) ("Unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment."); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981)
(Pain "totally without penological justification" is among that pain which is "unnecessary and
wanton"); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173
(1976); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (finding no cruelty where
there was "no purpose to inflict unnecessary pain nor any unnecessary pain involved in the pro-
posed execution").
81 See, e.g., Hope, 536 U.S. at 734-35 (describing how prisoner was handcuffed to a "hitching
post" on two separate days for a total of nine hours in the hot sun, denied water, and taunted);
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997) (vacating dismissal of civil rights prosecution of
state judge who sexually assaulted and orally raped litigants and employees); Hudson, 503 U.S.
at 4 (recounting that, while prisoner was in handcuffs and shackles, one guard punched him in
the "mouth, eyes, chest, and stomach" while another "held the inmate in place and kicked and
punched him from behind"); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 795 (1966) (describing the
purgoseful release of inmates so they could be caught and murdered).
See, e.g., Ellen L. Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, International Human Rights Law and Practice in
Latin America, 54 INT'L ORG. 649 (2000), reprinted in LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICs 249
(Judith L. Goldstein et al. eds., 2001) (describing patterns of torture in Uruguay and
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physical agony out of personal spite, because that person resembles
an individual who has done wrong, or in order to intimidate a popu-
lation by showing the barbarity of which the government is capable, a
court would have no difficulty finding that official in violation of the
demands of due process.
Few analysts, however, seriously suggest rounding up people who
look like terrorists and torturing them simply in hopes of intimidat-
ing future attackers, or torturing terrorists in custody for the purpose
of revenge. Rather, the argument is that torture would be necessary
to prevent disaster, or at least to reduce the probability of successful
future terrorist attacks. That purpose is certainly a legitimate one.
Does this mean that a government in search of information engages
not in "purposeless" but "purposeful" deprivations of liberty or "nec-
essary" imposition of pain, and therefore acts constitutionally when it
tortures?
The demands of due process are not so anemic. In the root case,
Rochin v. California, the actions of the police arose not from gratui-
tous cruelty or personal spite, but from tangible law enforcement ob-
jectives. Mr. Rochin's stomach was pumped in an effort to seize evi-
dence needed to enforce the criminal penalties against drug
possession. The intrusion was eminently reasonable as an instrumen-
tal matter; indeed, once the drugs had been swallowed, no less intru-
sive alternative could have achieved the objective. Nonetheless, the
Court found the deputy sheriffs' actions to be unconstitutionally
shocking to the judicial conscience. 4 If Rochin is the model, cruelty
cannot be justified simply because it seeks to achieve a legitimate ob-
jective.
government-sponsored disappearances in Argentina); Ruth Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence:
The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE L.J. 2009, 2036 (1997) (addressing trials of
Greek military colonels on torture charges and similar trials of members of Argentina's ruling
junta in the late 1970s and early 1980s); Meredeth Turshen, The Political Economy of Violence
Against Women During Armed Conflict in Uganda, 67 Soc. RES. 803, 805-08 (2000) (presenting
summary of how internal conflict in Uganda has led to systematic violence against civilians by
rebel and government armies); Alissa J. Rubin, Seduced by Power in the Service of Madness, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 2003, at Al (providing account of tortures inflicted on Iraqi civilians by Uday
Hussein).
83 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
84 Id. at 172.
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2. Balancings
When claims of liberty contend with concerns of public interest,
due process analysis often adopts a rhetoric of "balancing" or "com-
parison." For example, the court in Youngberg v. Romeo, in evaluating
the treatment of inmates in a hospital for the mentally retarded, an-
nounced that "[i]n determining whether a substantive right pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to
balance 'the liberty of the individual' and 'the demands of an organ-
ized society."'' 6 The presence of a legitimate purpose is not enough
to justify a severe imposition unless the "weight" of the purpose is
commensurate to the imposition.
Similarly, in evaluating efforts to obtain evidence from the bodies
of criminal suspects under the Fourth Amendment, the Court has
taken account of both the magnitude of the imposition on the sus-
pect and the exigency of the government's need for the evidence. 7
One argument that cannot be made in the cases contemplated by Professor Dershowitz
under current doctrine is that one "constitutional right" is balanced against another. After De-
Shaney, destruction wrought by terrorists may be a tragedy and a horror, but the failure to pre-
vent it cannot be said to be a "deprivation" by the government "triggering the protections of the
Due Process Clause," because there has been no "affirmative exercise of [state] power." De-
Shaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989).
86 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1982) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (advocating the process of "weigh ling] the individual's in-
terest in liberty against the State's asserted reasons for restraining individual liberty," but de-
termining that "this balancing cannot be left to the unguided discretion of ajudge orjury"). See
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 767-68 (1997) (Souter,J., concurring) ("[Aipproach
calls for a court to assess the relative 'weights' or dignities of the contending interests ....
[W]hen the legislation's justifying principle, critically valued, is so far from being commensu-
rate with the individual interest as to be arbitrarily or pointlessly applied [it will violate due
process] . . . ."); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (reasoning that
the scope of substantive due process rights is "determined by balancing [the individual's] liberty
interests against the relevant state interests" (quoting Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321)); Washington
v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 236 (1990) (approving "an accommodation between an inmate's lib-
erty interest in avoiding the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs and the State's inter-
ests in providing appropriate medical treatment to reduce the danger that an inmate suffering
from a serious mental disorder represents to himself or others"); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S.
432, 439 (1957) (comparing an individual's right "that his person be held inviolable" against
"the interests of society in the scientific determination of intoxication"); Jacobson v. Massachu-
setts, 197 U.S. 11, 26-27 (1905) (balancing individual's liberty interest in being free from fine
or imprisonment for not getting vaccinated against the state's interest in protecting public
health).
In Youngberg, the Court concluded that in a state-run hospital the state had "the unques-
tioned duty to provide reasonable safety for all residents and personnel within the institution.
And it may not restrain residents except when and to the extent professional judgment deems
this necessary to assure such safety or to provide needed training." 457 U.S. at 324.
87 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). In reviewing suspicionless visual body cavity
searches for pretrial detainees, the Court adopted a similar approach:
The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment .... [i]n each
case ... requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of
personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular
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In Schmerber v. California, the Court approved an involuntary blood
test to determine the blood-alcohol level of a driver who had been in-
volved in an accident. In determining that the action met "Fourth
Amendment standards of reasonableness," the Court-by a five-to-
four vote-observed that while the blood test intruded on the body of
the driver, the intrusion involved "virtually no risk, trauma, or pain,"
was performed "by a physician in a hospital environment according
to accepted medical practices," and was a commonplace test compa-
rable to those required for military service or a marriage license.8
On the government's side, in the majority's view, the need was both
pressing and ineluctable. Inebriation was difficult to prove by other
means, "the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish
shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from
the system," and "[e]xtraction of blood samples for testing is a highly
effective means of determining the degree to which a person is under
the influence of alcohol."8 9 A minimal imposition was warranted by
an overriding government necessity.
At the other end of the spectrum, in Winston v. Lee, the Court
unanimously viewed the balance as tilting unambiguously toward the
individual. In Winston, the state sought to require Rudolph Lee, a
suspected armed robber, to undergo surgery under total anesthesia
to remove a bullet from his shoulder in order to compare it to the
gun which was fired at the actual perpetrator of the robbery. Adopt-
ing "a case-by-case approach, in which the individual's interests in
privacy and security are weighed against society's interests," the Court
evaluated "the extent to which the procedure may threaten the safety
or health of the individual," and the "extent of intrusion upon the
intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the
place in which it is conducted.
Id.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Fourth Amendment is not directly applicable, several sub-
stantive due process cases have treated it as providing benchmarks of "reasonable" behavior. See
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (noting that prior to the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment via
the Fourteenth Amendment, state searches and seizures were analyzed under the Due Process
Clause, as in Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 439); id. at 287-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985), for the proposition that the Court's Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence has supported the ideas of "physical freedom and self-determination");
Harper, 494 U.S. at 229 (applying Fourth Amendment principles of Winston, 470 U.S. at 753, and
Schmerberv. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966), in the due process context); Schmerber, 384 U.S.
at 772 (noting relationship between Fourth Amendment and Due Process Clause).
98 Id. at 768, 771 & n.13.
89 Id. at 770-71. The Court had previously reached the same conclusion about the constitu-
tional permissibility of blood testing under a substantive due process analysis in Breithaupt, 352
U.S. at 436-37, applying Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), prior to incorporation of
the Fourth Amendment. But the analysis in Breithaupt focused entirely on the degree of brutal-
ity and the "sense of 'decency and fairness' that has been woven by common experience into
the fabric of acceptable conduct." 352 U.S. at 437.
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individual's dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integ-
rity," compared to "the community's interest in fairly and accurately
determining guilt or innocence. "' On the individual's side, the
Court saw the potential of substantial medical risk and viewed the in-
trusion on privacy as "severe;"9' on the government's side, the interest
in recovering the bullet was "hardly persuasive" given the "substantial
additional evidence" against the suspect.92 Notwithstanding its le-
gitimate purpose, a minimal gain to society did not render the intru-
sive surgery reasonable. On this analysis, the constitutional fault of
the deputies in Rochin was the disproportion between the level of in-
trusion and the magnitude of the police justification; the "brutal" in-
vasion of the body was carried out in an effort to enforce a prohibi-
tion of a virtually victimless crime.
Such a standard would place constitutional constraints on the use
of torture. If the magnitude of the interest necessary to justify an in-
tervention rises with its intrusiveness on bodily autonomy, health, and
safety, surely torture lies at the top of the scale. Torture is hardly a
commonly accepted medical procedure. Unlike the blood test in
,,93Schmerber, which carried with it "virtually no risk, trauma or pain, or
even the surgery in Winston, which was to be carried out under anes-
thesia, torture is specifically designed to induce trauma and pain, and
carries with it the risk of severe and lasting psychiatric damage. Even
the "stress and duress" techniques of "torture lite" would require sub-
stantial justification under a Fourth Amendment balancing test; the
mere possibility of obtaining useful information for the "war on ter-
ror" would not be sufficient. '
The struggle against illegal narcotics was viewed as an important
one, but was not adequate to justify pumping Mr. Rochin's stomach;
torturing him to reveal the location of his stash would be equally im-
proper. The need to punish armed robbers is crucial to a civilized
society, but the marginal addition of strength to the case against Mr.
Lee did not justify surgery, for his conviction seemed likely in any
event. The possibility that he could reveal the whereabouts of an ac-
complice would not have justified subjecting him to torture.
90 Winston, 470 U.S. at 760-62.
91 Id. at 766. The Court later noted:
[T] he Commonwealth proposes to take control of respondent's body, to "drug this citi-
zen-not yet convicted of a criminal offense-with narcotics and barbiturates into a state
of unconsciousness," and then to search beneath his skin for evidence of a crime. This
kind of surgery involves a virtually total divestment of respondent's ordinary control over
surgical probing beneath his skin.
Id. at 765 (citation omitted).
92 Id.
93 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
94 See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 56 (discussing the use of "torture lite" by the United States
after September 11).
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Analysts such as Professor Dershowitz, who make the case for the
possibility of torture, tend to gravitate toward the ticking bomb sce-
nario, where the captured terrorist announces that she and she alone
knows the location of a devastating device about to explode. Real life
is likely to generate examples substantially less clear-cut and compel-
ling. The suspect may be innocent or ignorant, her information may
be of only collateral or speculative value, the device may not exist, or
alternative sources of information may be adequate to the purpose.
It is important to emphasize that even an analysis of "reasonableness"
analogous to the Fourth Amendment limits cannot be read to author-
ize physical abuse simply on the basis of the aggregate magnitude of
harm that might be avoided. The requirement is that the incre-
mental gain in avoiding a great harm be sufficient to justify imposing
the contemplated level of harm on the individual. A speculative
benefit in the future cannot be said to reasonably justify the real and
present imposition of agony on a person screaming under the au-
thorities' ministrations.95
95 The deployment of deadly force to prevent the flight of a dangerous felon, if "the officer
has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm," upheld
in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985), is, on one level, justified by the magnitude of a con-
tingent threat. But it is justified as well by the felon's defiance of public order, and the threat
that the felon personally poses to law enforcement and the citizenry. By definition, a suspect
under interrogation poses no similar threat. It is precisely her helplessness that makes the tor-
ture repulsive. See Henry Shue, Torture, 7 PHIL. &PUB. AFF. 124, 130 (1978) (noting that torture
is not a "fair fight"). Notwithstanding the "importance" of the law enforcement effort, the doc-
trine of Garner would not countenance an effort to pistol whip an apprehended knifepoint
mugger into revealing the whereabouts of an accomplice who had escaped.
The Garner Court did not engage in unconstrained balancing. Rather, it relied substantially
on both common law practice and "prevailing rules in individual jurisdictions" to map the
boundaries of legitimate use of force in arrest. 471 U.S. at 14-16 (discussing process of "trans-
lat[ing]" common law principle to present day). The Court has regularly relied on common
law practice "woven into the fabric of early American law" to delineate the scope of "unreason-
able searches and seizures." CompareAtwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 333-41 (2001)
(noting that the common law practice of disallowing warrantless arrest for misdemeanors was
"riddled with exceptions," and could not serve as basis forjudging such arrests "unreasonable"),
with Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 933-34 (1995) (holding that the "knock and announce"
requirement of common law was "woven into" American practice and became a part of Fourth
Amendment definition of reasonableness). Unlike the use of force to apprehend fugitives,
there is neither common law warrant nor contemporary model for the use of torture against
taciturn suspects. See infra Part III.B.3.
To be sure, it could be that the suspect violates a law by refusing to answer if subject to a le-
gitimately empanelled grand jury inquiry, or by giving misleading answers to law enforcement
officials. But Garner would not countenance deployment of lethal force to apprehend fleeing
perjurers or contumacious witnesses. See 471 U.S. at 11 ("Where the suspect poses no immedi-
ate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend
him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so."). After appropriate process the recalci-
trant suspect may be incarcerated indefinitely or subjected to heavy fines or imprisonment. No
matter how important the interest that the state pursues, however, the punishment for such a
fault cannot exceed the level of barbarity precluded by the Eighth Amendment. It would be an
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On the other hand, if the judicial conscience is shocked only
where there is not a reasonable arithmetic proportion between the
incremental expected benefit to the public and the harm to the sub-
ject of torture, a sufficiently large fear of catastrophe could conceiva-
bly authorize almost any plausibly efficacious government action.
96
Even a small increase in the probability of avoiding a nuclear or bio-
logical holocaust could be argued to swamp almost any harm to a
single individual. The danger, to borrow the formula of Dostoevsky's
Ivan Karamazov, is that since 2,819 World Trade Center victims are
dead, everything is permitted.
In this respect, a principle of arithmetic proportionality rooted in
the prohibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures" does
not exhaust the demands of "ordered liberty." As a matter of precise
legal analysis, the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of "unreasonable
searches and seizures" is inapplicable to the situations under discus-
sion. By definition, a suspect in custody and available for torture is
one who has already been "seized."9 7 An effort to physically extort in-
formation is not a "search" for physical objects; it is an effort to break
the will of the subject in order to force the subject to reveal informa-
tion in that subject's mind. It is precisely because the physical
"searches" involved in the blood-testing cases upon which Professor
Dershowitz relies do not seek to force "communicative" actions that
courts have held they fall under the Fourth Amendment rather than
the more stringent protections against compelled self-incrimination. 98
The fact that torture is neither a search nor a seizure limits the
usefulness of Fourth Amendment cases in construing the demands of
"ordered liberty" and "due process of law," for the balancing doc-
odd result, indeed, if the state were able to impose heavier sanctions without judicial process
than those available with it.
This was the essence of the analysis in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951),
which accepted the government's argument that the magnitude of the harm associated with
Communist subversion justified curtailment of First Amendment rights even absent a likely or
present danger.
97 See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844 (1998) (stating that a Fourth
Amendment seizure occurs "when there is a governmental termination of freedom of move-
ment"); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989) (holding that Fourth Amend-
ment covers "intentional acquisition of physical control"); cf. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
395 (1989) ("[Claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force ... in the course
of an arrest.., or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard....").
98 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-65 (1966) (finding that a blood test did not
implicate subject's "testimonial capacities"); cf United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000)
(concluding that "[t]he Government's anemic view of respondent's act of [document] produc-
tion as a mere physical act that is principally nontestimonial in character and can be entirely
divorced from its 'implicit' testimonial aspect ... simply fails to account" for the reality that the
respondent engaged in mental processes to recall what documents were relevant and thus did
implicate his testimonial capacity).
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trines under the Fourth Amendment evolved to apply to a relatively
small spectrum of actions. No matter how important the issue, the
capacity of individuals to resist the search for physical objects can be
overcome by a relatively constrained expenditure of force. The mar-
tial capacity of the suspect forms a natural upper limit of the harm
that is necessary to effect a "search or seizure." For a suspect who is
in custody, that upper limit will usually involve the forcible deploy-
ment of handcuffs, or in an extreme case, anesthesia. A "reasonable"
search by definition will not reach the degrading and debilitating lim-
its of torture, so it is not necessary to be concerned with the possibil-
ity of "reasonable" atrocities. Interrogation, by contrast, is subject to
no similar upper bound; the pain and degradation that may be said
to be "necessary" is limited only by the will of the torturer and the re-
sistance of the tortured.
Notwithstanding the fact that a number of substantive due process
cases speak in terms of the "accommodation" of competing interests
on the basis of their "weights," that accommodation reaches beyond
arithmetic proportionality; the underlying question is whether the
accommodation in question is consistent with the "essence of a
scheme of ordered liberty" and the "traditions and conscience of our
people."9
As a matter of doctrine, the analysis of the role of physical abuse
in "ordered liberty" often diverges from consideration of arithmetic
proportionality. The opinions of Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and
Ginsburg in Chavez are uncompromising: torture, or its functional
equivalent, is inconsistent with the concept of "ordered liberty."'00
The opinions for the remainder of the Court, as I have noted, are
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937). See, e.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct.
1994, 2011 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Palko, 302 U.S.
at 325-26); Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 (same); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2492 n.3
(2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (inquiring into whether the right claimed is "implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty"); Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174, 2185 (2003) (also stressing con-
cept of "ordered liberty" in the context of a court determining whether the forced administra-
tion of drugs to render a defendant competent to stand trial is justified). Palko itself, while
rejecting the proposition that immunity "from compulsory self-incrimination" was part of the
"essence of a scheme of ordered liberty," went on to observe that "[n]o doubt there would re-
main the need to give protection against torture, physical or mental." 302 U.S. at 325-26.
100 Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2010 (Stevens,J, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (conclud-
ing that the "functional equivalent" of torture clearly violated the Constitution); id. at 2012
(stating that "official interrogation of that character is a classic example of a violation of a con-
stitutional right 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'"); id. at 2013 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) ("A constitutional right is traduced the moment torture or
its close equivalents are brought to bear."); id. at 2016 ("[T]orture or its equivalent in an at-
tempt to induce a statement violates an individual's fundamental right to liberty of the person."
(citations omitted)); id. at 2019-20 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(reasoning that due process and self-incrimination protections are "connected with the struggle
to eliminate torture as a governmental practice").
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more allusive. They refer to the statement in County of Sacramento v.
Lewis that conduct "most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking
level," is the "conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by
any government interest."'0 '
Lewis, in turn, though the most extensive modem discussion of
the issue, is likewise less than fully informative. There, the Court ad-
dressed the question of whether police who pursued a fleeing suspect
in a high-speed chase had deprived the suspect's passenger of life
without due process of law when that passenger was killed as a result
of what his representatives alleged was deliberate or reckless indiffer-
ence on the part of the pursuing officers. The Court's opinion began
by twice reiterating the proposition that the substantive dimensions
of due process "prevent government officials from 'abusing [their]
power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression,", 0 2 but em-
phasized that "only the most egregious official conduct can be said to
be 'arbitrary in the constitutional sense." 0 3 Citing Rochin and Daniels
v. Williams, the Court declared that only conduct that "shocks the





In determining that the representatives of Mr. Lewis had made no
such showing, the Court focused on the officer's purpose. It held
that in the context of a high-speed chase "even precipitate reckless-
ness fails to inch close enough to harmful purpose to spark the shock
that implicates 'the large concerns of the governors and the gov-
erned. - 0 6 In a high speed chase, the conscience would be shocked,
the Court stated, by a "purpose to cause harm" or to "terrorize, cause
harm, or kill.'' °7 If this is the test, the torture proposed by Professor
Dershowitz fails, for torture involves the specific intent to terrorize
and inflict pain on a helpless suspect in government custody.' °s
101 Id. at 2005 (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849); id. at 2008 (Souter,J., concurring) (same). As
noted,Justice O'Connor seems to join none of the opinions on this point. Cf Oregon v. Elstad,
470 U.S. 298, 312 n.3 (1985) (O'Connor, J., majority opinion) (taking as given that a confession
"obtained through overly or inherently coercive methods" would "raise serious Fifth Amend-
ment and due process concerns" (emphasis added)).
102 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 840, 846 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992))
(alteration in original).
1o' Id. at 846 (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 129).
4 Id. at 847 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952))
105 Id. at 853-54 (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986)).
106 Id. (quoting Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332).
107 Id. at 854, 855.
108 The Court in Lewis observed that in Rochin, "the case in which we formulated and first ap-
plied the shocks-the-conscience test, it was not the ultimate purpose of the government actors
to harm the plaintiff, but they apparently acted with full appreciation of what the Court de-
scribed as the brutality of their acts." 523 U.S. at 849 n.9. The Court also reiterated that failure
"to provide... basic human needs-e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable
safety" to those in government custody "transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by
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Elsewhere, the opinion made use of the Eighth Amendment as a
benchmark for the level of abuse that would rise to administer a
"shock to the judicial conscience.""o In particular, the Court referred
to the Eighth Amendment for the proposition that in the usual cus-
todial situations "deliberate indifference" to the safety of those in cus-
tody would violate the Constitution, while in situations analogous to
the control of a prison riot, liability should turn on "whether force
was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or
maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." 110
Torture, which seeks to break the will of a suspect, is undertaken
"for the purpose of causing harm," yet is not necessarily "malicious
and sadistic." By definition, cases of interrogation raise a claim that
the torture is necessary to achieve some important government end.
Torturers need not be sadists; they may be cold-blooded professionals
or even reluctant idealists. On the other hand, torture is not under-
taken in an effort to "maintain or restore discipline," "in haste and
under pressure," without time for deliberation. Torture is not ad-
ministered at split second intervals; indeed it is precisely the passage
of time that often combines with the physical agony to render the
conditions unendurable.
If the Eighth Amendment truly is the relevant source of normative
guidance, torture cannot be justified on grounds of public necessity.
The words of the Eighth Amendment prohibit "cruel and unusual"
punishments; 1 2 it is difficult to maintain that torture is not both cruel
and unusual today, as it was when the Amendment was adopted. The
judicial gloss on the Eighth Amendment prohibits "wanton and un-
necessary" imposition of pain. In the abstract one might argue that
the pain of torture contemplates "necessary" pain, since the legiti-
mate goal of preventing terrorist attacks is achieved only through the
deliberate imposition of pain. But the rack and the screw were not
viewed as entirely unnecessary by those who wielded them,'1 and the
the ... Due Process Clause." Id. at 851 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted). Tor-
ture is, of course, the polar opposite of the constitutionally required "reasonable provision[s]
for the [prisoner's] welfare." Id. at 852 n.12.
109 Id. at 852-53. The Court in Whitley v. Albets also read the two in pari materia:
It would indeed be surprising if, in the context of forceful prison security measures,
"conduct that shocks the conscience" or "afford [s] brutality the cloak of law," and so vio-
lates the Fourteenth Amendment [citing Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172, 173], were not also
punishment "inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency" and "repugnant to
the conscience of mankind," [citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 106 (1976)], in
violation of the Eighth [Amendment].
475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (first alteration in original).
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 853 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21).: Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320, quoted in Lewis, 523 U.S. at 852-53.112 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
113 Compare LANGBEIN, supra note 19, with EDWARD PETERS, TORTURE (expanded ed. 1996),
and Mirjan Damaska, The Death of Legal Torture, 87 YALE L.J. 860, 876-77 (1978) (reviewing
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heritage of the Eighth Amendment permits neither. The parameters
are set by the Court's observation in Hudson v. McMillian,"'4 holding
that a beating of an inmate by prison guards violates the Eighth
Amendment:
[A]n Eighth Amendment claim is... contextual and responsive to "con-
temporary standards of decency." For instance, extreme deprivations are
required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim. Because rou-
tine discomfort is "part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for
their offenses against society," "only those deprivations denying 'the mini-
mal civilized measure of life's necessities' are sufficiently grave to form
the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation"....
In the excessive force context, society's expectations are different.
When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm,
contemporary standards of decency always are violated. This is true
whether or not significant injury is evident. Otherwise, the Eighth
Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how dia-
bolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury.
Such a result would have been as unacceptable to the drafters of the
Eighth Amendment as it is today.115
3. "Traditions from Which It Broke"
These constitutional side constraints on the use of physical force
cannot be explained by an arithmetic proportionality; rather, they re-
flect the nature of our society, from which our public tradition arises
and which it reciprocally constitutes. In evaluating accommodations
between order and liberty, as Justice Harlan observed, the Court must
give regard to traditions of our country, both "the traditions from
which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke."
1 6
Those traditions have no place for official torture.
LANGBEIN, supra note 19) (describing Continental claims that torture was necessary to prevent
crime). One opponent of the adoption of the Eighth Amendment put the matter as follows:
[I]t is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps
having their ears cut off; but are we in future to be prevented from inflicting these pun-
ishments because they are cruel? ... [U] ntil we have some security that this will be done,
we ought not to be restrained from making necessary laws by any declaration of this
kind.
I ANNALS OF CONG. 782-83 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (Statement of Mr. Livermore).
114 503 U.S. 1 (1992). See also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 734-35 (2002), where the Court,
in describing an inmate's shackling to a hitching post for a total of nine hours on two days, sug-
gests that "torture lite" is equally impermissible.
115 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8-9 (citations omitted).
116 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan,J., dissenting) ("The balance of which I speak is
the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from
which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke."), quoted in Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992). Cf Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2480 (2003)
("In all events we think that our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most rele-
vance here."); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997) (beginning due process
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Though torture was not entirely absent in fifteenth and sixteenth
century English practice, it was always exceptional and the common
law, by the time of Blackstone, excluded torture for purposes of ob-
taining information:
[T] he trial by rack is utterly unknown to the law of England; though once
when the dukes of Exeter and Suffolk, and other ministers of Henry VI,
had laid a design to introduce the civil law into this kingdom as the rule
of government, for a beginning thereof they erected a rack for torture;
which was called in derision the duke of Exeter's daughter, and still re-
mains in the tower of London: where it was occasionally used as an en-
gine of state, not of law, more than once in the reign of queen Elizabeth.
But when, upon the assassination of Villiers duke of Buckingham by Fel-
ton, it was proposed in the privy council to put the assassin to the rack, in
order to discover his accomplices; the judges, being consulted, declared
unanimously, to their own honour and the honour of the English law,
that no such proceeding was allowable by the laws of England. It seems
astonishing that this usage, of administering the torture, should be said
to arise from a tenderness to the lives of men: and yet this is the reason
given for it's introduction in the civil law, and it's subsequent adoption by
the French and other foreign nations.'
7
analysis "by examining our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices" (citing Casey, 505
U.S. at 849-50, and Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269-79 (1990))); id. at
764 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[C]lashing principles... [are] to be weighed
within the history of our values as a people.").
117 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES*320-21. The assassination occurred in 1628. See
LANGBEIN, supra note 19, at 139 ("For the future of common law criminal procedure, the Eng-
lish experiment with torture left no traces."); 5 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
185 (1924) ("[I] t is also clear from the works of Fortescue, Smith, and Coke, and from the reso-
lution of the judges in Felton's Case, that the use of torture was wholly contrary to the common
law." (citations omitted)).
Professor Dershowitz, relying on the research of Professor Langbein, maintains that "there
was a time in the history of Anglo-Saxon law when torture was used to save life, rather than to
take it, and when the limited administration of nonlethal torture was supervised by judges."
WHY TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 11, at 155-56. He neglects to mention that torture was a
dubious exception to the common law rule, and ended in the reign of the early Stuarts, before
the Petition of Right in 1628 or the English Bill of Rights in 1689 that set the template for
American constitutional thought. LANGBEIN, supra note 19, at 135 ("After 1640 [the year of the
abolition of the Star Chamber], torture was never again warranted in England .... [After]
1626 the [Privy] Council never again issued a torture warrant.").
Professor Dershowitz also appears to be somewhat confused in suggesting that English prac-
tice resorted to torture to avoid a requirement of "the testimony of two eyewitnesses or the con-
fession," WHY TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 11, at 156, or that the French practice of torture
was somehow less "visible" than that in England, id. at 158. As the pages in Langbein to which
Professor Dershowitz refers make obvious, the two-witness/confession rule and its attendant
difficulty of conviction was the Continental, not the common law, rule. LANGBEIN, supra note 19,
at 7; see also id. at 73 ("[T]he systematic use of torture to investigate crime never established it-
self in English criminal procedure."); id. at 78 ( noting that England "developed no institutions
to conduct torture" in part because jurors chosen already knew the facts of a case and did not
need an "outside officer to investigate crime"). The French practice was wholly public and bu-
reaucratized. Langbein suggests that the loosening of the laws of proof ended the necessity for
torture on the Continent, but observes such rules already applied in England. Id. at 77-78.
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Like Blackstone, the Framers of the American Constitution viewed
torture as a mechanism associated with the vices of Continental des-
potism. Thus, Patrick Henry objected in the Virginia ratifying con-
vention to the absence of a prohibition on torture:
What has distinguished our ancestors?-That they would not admit of
tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishment. But Congress may intro-
duce the practice of the civil law, in preference to that of the common
law. They may introduce the practice of France, Spain, and Germany-
of torturing, to extort a confession of the crime. They will say that they
might as well draw examples from those countries as from Great Britain,
and they will tell you that there is such a necessity of strengthening the
arm of government, that they must have a criminal equity, and extort
confession by torture, in order to punish with still more relentless sever-
ity 118ity.
l l
These origins have been regularly cited as constitutive of our consti-
tutional tradition.1"9
This rejection of torture as alien to the heritage of English liberty
held sway through the early decades of the Republic, ° supplemented
by the rejection of sanguinary and afflictive punishments more gen-
118 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTIONS OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 447-48 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Phila., J.P. Lippincott 1836). The debate contin-
ued:
Mr. George Mason replied that the worthy gentleman was mistaken in his assertion that
the bill of rights did not prohibit torture; for that one clause expressly provided that no
man can give evidence against himself; and that the worthy gentleman must know that,
in those countries where torture is used, evidence was extorted from the criminal him-
self. Another clause of the bill of rights provided that no cruel and unusual punish-
ments shall be inflicted; therefore, torture was included in the prohibition.
Id. at 452. See generally, WILLIAM PENN, THE EXCELLENT PRIVILEDGE OF LIBERTY AND PROPERTY
BEING THE BIRTH-RIGHT OF THE FREE-BORN SUBJECTS OF ENGLAND, at iii (Phila., William Brad-
ford, Philobiblon Club ed. 1897) (1687) ("In France, and other Nations .... if any two Villains
will but swear against the poor Party, his Life is gone; nay, if there be no witness, yet he may be
put on the Rack.").
119 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 170 n.17 (1976) (citing Patrick Henry's remarks);
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581 n.23 (1961) (same); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S.
227, 236 n.9 (1940) (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371-73 (1910), for Henry's re-
marks).
120 STORY, supra note 2, at 662-63 ("[The Self-Incrimination Clause] is of inestimable value.
It is well known, that in some countries, not only are criminals compelled to give evidence
against themselves, but are subjected to the rack or torture in order to procure a confession of
guilt."). See Culombe for a recognition of the constitutional status of:
a cluster of convictions each expressive, in a different manifestation, of the basic notion
that the terrible engine of the criminal law is not to be used to overreach individuals who
stand helpless against it. Among these are the notions that men are not to be impris-
oned at the unfettered will of their prosecutors, nor subjected to physical brutality by of-
ficials charged with the investigation of crime.... This principle, branded into the con-
sciousness of our civilization by the memory of the secret inquisitions, sometimes
practiced with torture, which were borrowed briefly from the continent during the era of
the Star Chamber, was well known to those who established the American governments.
367 U.S. at 581.
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erally as anathema to a culture of liberty.'' When European govern-
ments moved to eliminate official torture in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth century, America applauded.
2
1
The replacement of local justices of the peace by extensive police
forces charged with investigating and suppressing crime in late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century America was accompanied by or-
ganized physical abuse of suspects designed to achieve those ends;'
2 3
the term "the third degree" gained currency among American police
officials during the early twentieth century. 24 "Third degree" brutal-
ity by police officials, however, was judged constitutionally anathema
by the Supreme Court in the aftermath of the exposure and con-
demnation of the practice by such authorities as the American Bar
Association and the Wickersham Commission Report in the early
1930s. 2 5 That official rejection was reinforced by the revulsion against
121 See, e.g., ADAM JAY HIRSCH, THE RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY: PRISONS AND PUNISHMENT IN
EARLY AMERICA 44 (1992) (explaining that, in building momentum for the establishment of
penitentiaries in the eighteenth century, "[b
]
ecause carceral punishment sought to rehabilitate
offenders, [American] advocates viewed it as a more 'benevolent' solution to crime than 'san-
guinary' alternatives, such as capital punishment (and, as then functioning, the old corporal
punishments)"); LOUIS P. MASUR, RITES OF EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1776-1865, at 61 (1989) ("[I]f severe and excessive
punishments marked monarchies, mild and benevolent ones would have to characterize repub-
lics. The logic of republicanism forced some Americans to reconsider the problem of deviance
and to oppose capital punishment as unrepublican."); MERANZE, supra note 59, at 68 (reporting
that "Revolutionary-era reformers... linked the practice of capital and corporal punishments
to the archaisms of tyranny and monarchy").122
For accounts of the Continental abandonment of torture, see, for example, MALCOLM D.
EVANS & ROD MORGAN, PREVENTING TORTURE 7-13 (1998), PETERS, supra note 19, at 73-75, 99-
102, LISA SILVERMAN, TORTURED SUBJECTS: PAIN, TRUTH, AND THE BODY IN EARLY MODERN
FRANCE (2001), and Damaska, supra note 113, at 876-83. For American reactions, see, for ex-
ample, HENRY C. LEA, SUPERSTITION AND FORCE (Philadelphia, Collins 1866).
See PETERS, supra note 19, at 111-12 (describing the corruption which resulted from the
"entanglement" of American police forces and local political forces in the early twentieth cen-
tury); Office of Legal Policy, Dep't of Justice, The Law of Pretrial Interrogation, 22 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 437, 463-64 (1989) (observing that as the "locus of interrogation moved from the
courtroom to the stationhouse," "the use of 'third degree' methods by the police to obtain con-
fessions became common, and persisted as a widespread practice until at least the 1930s").
124 See NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, PUB. NO. 11, REPORT ON
LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 19-20 (1931) [hereinafter WICKERSHAM COMM'N] (defining
the term "the third degree" and explaining its origins); Richard Sylvester, A History of the "Sweat
Box" and the "Third Degree," in THE BLUE AND THE BRASS: AMERICAN POLICING: 1890-1910, at 72-
73 (1976). Professor Friedman reports that the term occurred as early as 1887. FRIEDMAN, su-
pra note 59, at 501 n.18.
125 WICKERSHAM COMM'N, supra note 124, at 5 ("[T]he practice is shocking in its character
and extent, violative of American traditions and institutions, and not to be tolerated."). See
EMANUEL H. LAVINE, THE THIRD DEGREE: A DETAILED AND APPALLING EXPOSE OF POLICE
BRUTALITY (1930) (report of American Bar Association's Committee on Lawless Enforcement
of the Law); JEROME H. SKOLNICK &JAMESJ. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE
USE OF FORCE 61-66 (1993) (giving account of the impact of the Wickersham Commission and
rejection of third degree practice).
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torture as characteristic of America's totalitarian enemies. 26 It has
now been three generations since American law enforcement has of-
Numerous opinions cite the Wickersham Commission report and condemn police use of
third degree methods as unconstitutional. See, e.g., Culombe, 367 U.S. at 571-74 nn.2-3, 6, & 8
(citing WICKERSHAM COMM'N) (describing the pressure police feel to coerce a confession which
may ultimately lead to violence); Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 101 (1951) ("[W]here
police take matters in their own hands, seize victims, beat and pound them until they confess,
there cannot be the slightest doubt that the police have deprived the victim of a right under the
Constitution."); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 407 (1945) (stating that the coerced con-
fession was one of fear, on the basis of which the court could not permit a person to stand con-
victed of a crime); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 149-50 n.4-5, 151-52 (1944) (citing
WICKERSHAM COMM'N) (portraying the various intimidation tactics employed by officers in an
attempt to get a confession); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 555 (1942) (holding that a prisoner's
confession was not free and voluntary, but given under duress); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530,
533 (1940) (citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940)) ("Due Process of
law ... commands that no such practice. . . shall send any accused to his death."); Chambers,
309 U.S. at 238 n.ll, 240 & n.15 (citing WICKERSHAM COMM'N) (asserting that the third degree
is often used against the poor and has caused a general unwillingness to cooperate); Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) ("It would be difficult to conceive of methods more revolt-
ing to the sense of justice than those taken to procure the confessions of these petition-
ers .... ").
Compare McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 344 (1943) (stating that the requirement of
speedy arraignment seeks to avoid police having to "resort to those reprehensible practices
known as the 'third degree' which, though universally rejected as indefensible, still find their
way into use"), with Ashcraf, 322 U.S. at 160 (Jackson,J., dissenting) ("Interrogation per se is not,
while violence per se is, an outlaw.").
126 See, e.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994, 2012 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (deploring "the kind of custodial interrogation that was once employed
by the Star Chamber, by 'the Germans of the 1930's and early 1940's,' and by some of our own
police departments only a few decades ago" (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 371
(1985) (StevensJ, dissenting)). In Chambers, the Court noted:
Tyrannical governments had immemorially utilized dictatorial criminal procedure and
punishment to make scapegoats of the weak, or of helpless political, religious, or racial
minorities and those who differed, who would not conform and who resisted tyranny....
The rack, the thumbscrew, the wheel, solitary confinement, protracted questioning and
cross questioning, and other ingenious forms of entrapment of the helpless or unpopu-
lar had left their wake of mutilated bodies and shattered minds along the way to the
cross, the guillotine, the stake and the hangman's noose.
309 U.S. at 236-38. So, too, Justice Blackmun argued, in Hudson v. McMillian, that the Consti-
tution prohibits:
[S] tate-sponsored torture and abuse-of the kind ingeniously designed to cause pain but
without a telltale "significant injury". ... [Such as] lashing prisoners with leather straps,
whipping them with rubber hoses, beating them with naked fists, shocking them with
electric currents, asphyxiating them short of death, intentionally exposing them to un-
due heat or cold, or forcibly injecting them with psychosis-inducing drugs. These tech-
niques, commonly thought to be practiced only outside this Nation's borders, are hardly
unknown within this Nation's prisons.
503 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1992) (Blackmun,J., concurring in the judgment).
One of the counts in the Nuremberg indictment of Gestapo officials detailed official orders
approving the application of "third degree" techniques, including "[a] very simple diet (bread
and water)[,] hard bunk[,] dark cell[,] deprivation of sleep[,] exhaustive drilling[, ...
[and] flogging (for more than 29 strokes a doctor must be consulted)" as a means of obtaining
evidence, or "information of important facts" regarding subversion. 2 OFFICE OF THE U.S. CHIEF
COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY, NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION 295
(1946), available at http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/Gestapo6.htm (last visited Oct. 16,
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ficially denounced third degree techniques,127 and by the middle of
the twentieth century, the Court could declare:
The argument that without such interrogation it is often impossible to
close the hiatus between suspicion and proof, especially in cases involving
professional criminals, is often pressed in quarters responsible and not
unfeeling. It is the same argument that was once invoked to support the
lash and the rack ... "The Constitution proscribes such lawless means
irrespective of the end.' 28
That conclusion is no less true today; in the "balance" between order
and liberty, American traditions have denounced the use of torture
and its cognates not because they are irrational, but because they cor-
rode the core of our public liberty and national identity.
29
2003); see also PETERS, supra note 19, at 124-25. One of the defenses raised by Gestapo officers
was that such actions were necessary to protect against Resistance terrorism. 20 TRIAL OF
GERMAN MAJOR WAAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL:
PROCEEDINGS, ONE HUNDRED AND NINETY-SECOND DAY (1946) (containing testimony of witness
Karl Heinz Hoffman: "[T]hird degree was carried out during interrogations. To explain this I
have to point out that the resistance organizations occupied themselves with the following: First,
attacks on German soldiers.... ."), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/
imt/proc/08-01-46.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2003). See generally http://www.nizkor.org (last
visited Oct. 16, 2003) (providing numerous Nuremberg trial documents).
127 See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OFJUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 93 (1967) ("[T]oday the third degree is almost nonexistent .... few
Americans regret its virtual abandonment by the police."); Richard A. Leo, From Coercion to De-
ception: The Changing Nature of Police Interrogation in America, 18 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 35, 49
(1992) ("By the mid-1940s, most police chiefs in America openly condemned the use of third
degree practices.").
28 Culombe, 367 U.S. at 587-88 (quoting Chambers, 309 U.S. at 240-41). Other examples of
public policies that predictably result in the risk of physical harm or pain are distinguishable
from interrogational torture. A military draft subjects citizens to the possibility, not the assur-
ance, of physical danger, and in any event is governed by the laws of war, which prohibit tor-
ture.
A prohibition of the abortion of a viable fetus occupies a woman's body but does not impose
torturous pain. The woman can always seek anesthesia in childbirth, and, in any event, a threat
to the "health of the mother" constitutionally overrides any prohibition. See Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930-31 (2000); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).
Jacobson v. Massachusetts permitted mandatory vaccination, but assumed that courts would
protect a patient if the vaccination would "seriously impair his health" or result in "cruel and
inhuman" impositions. 197 U.S. 11, 38--39 (1905).
Mandatory medical procedures have been upheld under due process scrutiny only where
they are in the medical interest of the patient, a situation hardly applicable to interrogational
torture. See supra note 75 (discussing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), and Sell v.
United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003)).
1 As recently as 1999, the official position of the U.S. State Department was that "Every act
of torture within the meaning of the Convention [Against Torture] is illegal under existing fed-
eral and state law, and any individual who commits such an act is subject to penal sanctions as
specified in criminal statutes." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INITIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA TO THE U.N. COMMITrEE AGAINST TORTURE, Part II.B (Oct. 15, 1999), available at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights/torturearticles.html.
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At the time of its founding, America invoked "a decent respect to
the opinions of mankind,"3 ° and over the centuries we have culti-
vated a self-image as a country at the vanguard of human rights. As a
jurisprudence of human rights has taken root around the world, Su-
preme Court majorities have begun to refer to consensus opinion in
international law as one guidepost to the nature of acceptable prac-
tice under our own constitutional guarantees.13 ' These references
have not been uncontroversial, 2 and I have myself registered some
doubts about the process of uncritical constitutional borrowing.
3 3
Nonetheless, in my view, official international consensus is relevant to
the domestic "conscience of the court," particularly where it points to
dangers of abuse that could plausibly threaten our own polity. It is
clear that the international prohibition against torture and its co-
nates is rooted in an array of official declarations and conventions,
but it has evolved into a jus cogens norm of international law,
grounded in the fundamental moral perceptions of the international
community and the temptations that arise in mortal international
confrontation. s5  In a globalizing world, these moral commitments
130 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
131 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481 (2003) (referencing the European Con-
vention on Human Rights in constructing substantive due process rights); Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (invoking international human rights law as a reference in con-
struing the Eighth Amendment); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 710 (1987) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (invoking Nuremberg principles in construing
demands of due process).
132 See, e.g., Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court's discussion of
these foreign views . . . is therefore meaningless dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since 'this
Court... should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.'") (citing Foster v.
Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)).
133 See Seth F. Kreimer, Invidious Comparisons: Some Cautionary Remarks on the Process of Consti-
tutional Borrowing, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 640, 646-48 (1999) (discussing three structural prob-
lems that arise in attempts to apply doctrine developed in one nation's constitutional jurispru-
dence to answer questions posed in the jurisprudence of another).
134 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 re-
porter's note 5 (1987) (setting forth international covenants and declarations condemning tor-
ture).
135 See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, 00-56628, 00-57195, 2002 U.S. App.
LEXIS 19263, at *28 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002) ("[T]orture, murder, and slavery are jus cogens
violations and, thus, violations of the law of nations."), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 2003
U.S. App. LEXIS 2716 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2003); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (lth Cir.
1996) (affirming Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA") judgment against former Ethiopian official
for torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment as violation of international law);
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (concluding that alleged torture, and other atroci-
ties committed by a Bosnian Serb leader were actionable under the ATCA as violations of inter-
national law). The court noted in In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, Human Rights Litigation:
The right to be free from official torture is fundamental and universal, a right deserving
of the highest stature under international law, a norm of jus cogens. The crack of the
whip, the clamp of the thumb screw, the crush of the iron maiden, and, in these more ef-
ficient modern times, the shock of the electric cattle prod are forms of torture that the
international order will not tolerate.
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reinforce the revulsion against torture which arises from our own his-
tory.
IV. THE EFFECT OF A CONTINUED PROHIBITION
Professor Dershowitz closes his account by declaring his belief
that, paradoxically, "a formal requirement of a judicial warrant as a
prerequisite to nonlethal torture would decrease the amount of
physical violence directed against suspects."0 6  The argument pro-
ceeds in three steps. First, Professor Dershowitz believes that the re-
cord shows that "torture sometimes does work and can sometimes
prevent major disasters" that can be averted in no other fashion.
13 7
Second, in light of this efficacy, he believes that public opinion would
condemn a refusal to utilize it to prevent terrorist attacks, and that
American officials would in fact engage in torture.' From these
premises Professor Dershowitz concludes:
The real issue, therefore, is not whether some torture would or would not
be used in the ticking bomb case-it would. The question is whether it
would be done openly, pursuant to a previously established legal proce-
dure, or whether it would be done secretly, in violation of existing law. 
39
As between the two options, he maintains that the use of open and
established procedures is likely to result in less torture.
"Off the record" abuse, according to Professor Dershowitz, could
take place on the basis of the decision of a single executive official.
Such abuse, his argument continues, would be deployed under the
25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994). See also In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, Human Rights
Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 499 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[I]t would be unthinkable to conclude other than
that acts of official torture violate customary international law."), cited with approval in Alvarez-
Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 612 (9th Cir. 2003); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,
890 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Indeed, for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become-like the
pirate and slave trader before him-hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.");
Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995) (deeming torture by Guatemalan military
to be actionable violations of international law under the ATCA); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1987) ("A state violates [customary]
international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones... torture
or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. ").
136 WHY TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 11, at 158. See also Levinson, Precommitment, supra note
12, at 2048 ("If one believes that there is a genuine probability of what might be termed the
underenforcement of the norm against torture-and any other view is willfully naive-then we
should take seriously Dershowitz's suggestion that we look at torture from an ex ante perspec-
tive rather than the presumptively inadequate ex post one.").
137 WHY TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 11, at 138.
1 See id. at 150-51 (referring to "a ticking bomb," a "preventable act of terrorism," a "pre-
ventable act of terrorism [that] was of the magnitude of the attacks of September 11," and "tor-
ture of terrorist suspects"). It is unclear in which cases Professor Dershowitz believes that tor-
ture would inevitably be used.
139 Id. at 151.
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unguided discretion of street-level bureaucrats.' It would take place
in secret and would be subject to substantial sanction only if it were
discovered, a prosecution were brought, and a jury could be per-
suaded to convict after resolving conflicts of testimony.
By contrast, argues Professor Dershowitz, a torture warrant would
not issue unless both executive officials and judges agree it is appro-
priate (and presumably a lawyer would be required to file the appli-
cation). Officials, he claims, are unlikely to seek torture warrants and
judges are unlikely to authorize torture warrants in the absence of
"compelling evidence." A torture warrant would leave an official re-
cord; both judges and executive officials, argues Professor Dershow-
itz, would be held accountable for their excesses. 141
Though some commentators express skepticism, 4 2 for present
purposes I would grant the first step in Professor Dershowitz's argu-
ment as he articulates it: torture "sometimes" can be the only mecha-
nism that will prevent major terrorist attacks. Likewise, I would not
disagree with Professor Dershowitz that a significant number of
Americans might well condone torture to prevent terrorist attacks,
43
as they might condone a variety of other unconstitutional practices,
and that American officials would in some circumstances act in ac-
cord with those opinions. Indeed, if torture could be confined to a
limited situation in which it represented the only way of preventing
vast devastation, there are not inconsiderable arguments that, as a
matter of both policy and public ethics, an official might choose to
violate legal and otherwise peremptory moral norms by ordering such
torture.
140 Id. at 154.
1 Id. at 152-53, 158-59.
142 See, e.g., Joe W. Pitts, America and the World: Human Rights at Home and Abroad, 5 SCHOLAR
5, 13 (2002) ("[T]orture just doesn't work. People under torture will often say whatever they
need to say to avoid or stop the torture."); William J. Stun tz, Book Review, Christian Legal Theory,
116 HARv. L. REv. 1707, 1743 n.107 (2003) ("[Dershowitz's] argument seems to me unconvinc-
ing.... [FBI Algents' preference for drugs over torture suggests that Dershowitz may be exag-
gerating torture's benefits.... [T]orture tends to reduce accuracy-suspects' incentives are to
say whatever will stop the torture, true or not. . . ."); Chanterelle Sung, Book Review, Torturing
the Ticking Bomb Terrorist, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 193, 210-11 (2003) (reviewing WHY
TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 11) (arguing that alternative sources of intelligence information
make torture unnecessary).
143 See Abraham McLaughlin & Seth Stem, How Far Americans Would Go to Fight Terror,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 14, 2001, at 1 (reporting that thirty-two percent of respondents
could support government-sanctioned torture of terrorist suspects); Nancy L. Torner, US. Say
It's OK to Torture POWs, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Oct. 19, 1999 ("[Thirty-two] percent of Americans
believe it is acceptable to torture prisoners of war to obtain important military information, ac-
cording to a survey commissioned by the International Committee of the Red Cross."). But see
Retro Poll, Poll No. 2, Apr. 2003, at http: //www.retropoll.org/results.htm (last visited Sept. 22,
2003) (presenting small nonprofit polling organization's survey of 215 people, which found
that 88.1% rejected the "use of outlawed interrogation techniques such as torture" in the war
on terror).
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Professor Dershowitz's analysis, however, diverges from mine in
his implicit assertion that torture would, in fact, be so confined. Pro-
fessor Dershowitz asserts that "sometimes" torture will be ineluctably
necessary; the converse of this assertion is that "sometimes" torture
will wreak human havoc without any discernable, much less propor-
tionate public benefit, and "sometimes" the benefits sought could be
achieved without resort to torture." It is far from clear that an insti-
tutional structure that contemplates "torture warrants" would mini-
mize those latter "times." Indeed, under current circumstances, such
an institution is likely to encourage officials to yield to what General
Jacques de Bollardi~re referred to in the aftermath of the Battle of
Algiers as the "mortal temptation of instantaneous efficacity.'
4 5
Let us begin with the question of accuracy. Assume for the mo-
ment that there is a limited class of cases involving: (1) "ticking
bombs;" (2) convicted terrorists who set the bombs and hold infor-
mation that could prevent devastation; and (3) the absence of any al-
ternative means of obtaining the information in question and that an
omniscient, dispassionate, and impartial magistrate should issue a
"torture warrant" against such terrorists. How likely is it that warrants
will issue in those and only those cases?
Judges are not, in fact, omniscient. They must rely on the show-
ings made by the officials who seek the warrants for their informa-
tion. Current experience with search warrants suggests that even in
situations in which the stakes are considerably lower, officials have
embellished the truth in their efforts to serve the perceived ends of
law enforcement.4 6  By Professor Dershowitz's hypothesis, officials
144 In 1956, after the French had used torture in the Battle of Algiers, Paul Teitgen, the secre-
tary-general of the Algiers prefecture, resisted the pressure of his chief of police to authorize
the torture of a terrorist who had been apprehended while placing a bomb in a gasworks. A
second bomb was allegedly set to explode in the gasworks, and could have triggered an explo-
sion of stored gas that would have endangered the entire city. In fact, no second bomb ex-
ploded, and it is not clear whether such a bomb existed. See EVANS & MORGAN, supra note 122,
at 44 n.88 (describing the "ticking bomb" dilemma that faced Teitgen). Maitre Teitgen's re-
solve was based on the proposition that "if you once get into the torture business, you're
lost.... All our so-called civilisation is covered with varnish." RITA MARAN, TORTURE: THE
ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN THE FRENCH-ALGERIAN WAR 118 (1989) (quoting ALISTAIR HORNE, A
SAVAGE WAR OF PEACE 204 (1977)).
145 MARAN, supra note 144, at 117 (quoting JACQUES DE BOLLARDIERE, BATAILLE DE L'ALGER
98 (1972)).
146 Where much less than a potential terror attack is at stake, police are known to lie on occa-
sion. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITz, REASONABLE DOUBTS 60-61 (1996) (describing Professor
Dershowitz's public discussions of the problem of police lying to admit incriminating evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and
the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75 (1992)
(summarizing interviews with law enforcement and court personnel suggesting that police per-
jury in Fourth Amendment context happens in nearly twenty percent of cases); L. Timothy
Perrin, et al., If It's Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule: A New and Extensive Empiri-
cal Study of the Exclusionary Rule and a Call for a Civil Administrative Remedy to Partially Replace the
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would be willing to violate a prohibition of torture to achieve antiter-
rorist goals; one might suspect those same officials would be inclined
to "sex up" applications for torture warrants.147 On the judges' side, a
"torture warrant" court may not be the most skeptical bench, and
they, like executive officials, would be subject to public pressure to do
everything possible to prevent a recurrence of September 11.148
Armed with a doctrine that requires them to "balance" the rights
of suspects against the needs of the public, it seems entirely plausible
to predict that judges would issue warrants in cases far short of the
"ticking bomb." Each warrant granted would be the starting point for
an argument that a subsequent warrant should be granted in circum-
Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 725-27 (1998) (finding a suggestion in a survey of nearly 460 police
officers that "the exclusionary rule on occasion does put officers in a position of manipulating
the facts to avoid the loss of the evidence"); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and
What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1059 (1996) (describing the scope of police lying
and suggesting that "rewards for truth telling, the redefinition of probable cause, and the
elimination of the exclusionary rule" may be solutions).
Police perjury can also be problematic for courts outside the Fourth Amendment context.
See Press Release, Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office, District Attorney Points to Re-
forms as Final Cases Released (Nov. 25, 2002), available at http://da.co.la.ca.us/
mr/112502a.htm (reviewing the scope of a scandal at the Los Angeles Police Department's
Rampart Division, in which a former gang unit officer admitted that he and others covered up
for improper police shootings by lying on the stand in criminal cases against gang members,
leading to "whole-scale dismissals of cases through writs of Habeas Corpus and Coram Nobis").
147 See, e.g., In reMaterial Witness Warrant, 214 F. Supp. 2d 356, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (contain-
ing a description of the government misleading the court in an application for a material wit-
ness warrant in the aftermath of September 11).
One could hypothesize an adversarial proceeding in which the suspect's counsel could con-
test the showing. The current administration takes the position that "national security" bars
revelation of the basis of "anti-terrorist deportations," the identity of detainees, and the number
of "sneak and peek" warrants. See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d
918, 927 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (reiterating "the principle of deference to the executive in the [Free-
dom of Information Act] context when national security concerns are implicated"); ACLU v.
U.S. Dep't of'Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 23-24 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (detailing refusal to reveal the
level of use of "sneak and peak" warrants on grounds of national security); N. Jersey Media
Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 217 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding persuasive the government's
"substantial evidence that open deportation hearings would threaten national security"); De-
troit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 705-07 (6th Cir. 2002) (summarizing and accepting
the government's national security arguments for prohibiting public access to deportation hear-
ings). Given this background, the concept that the system likely to evolve is one that would of-
fer real adversarial hearings rests in the realm of fantasy.
148 Professor Levinson's suggestion that "perhaps the judges should actually experience what
they are condemning the victims to" in order to get for themselves a sense of what they will be
dispensing as a means of "concentrating the judicial mind" seems even less likely of adoption
than a contested hearing. Levinson, Precommitment, supra note 12, at 2049. We do not, after all,
require judges to spend time incarcerated before they pronounce prison sentences. Moreover,
given the mechanisms of cognitive dissonance, it might well make judges more willing to dis-
pense torture. Cf MARAN, supra note 144, at 102 (describing how, after Col. Jacques Massu,
commander of the French paratroopers in the Battle of Algiers, experimented on himself with
"electrical shocks to sensitive parts of the body" he concluded that "such methods. . . 'did not
degrade the individual'" (quotingJACQUES MASSU, LAVRAIE BATrAILLE 165 (1971))).
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stances just a little bit short of the exigencies of the prior case. The
process can be observed in Professor Dershowitz's own account. Pro-
fessor Dershowitz acknowledges the danger of the slippery slope, but
maintains that the appropriate response is to build a "principled
break." He proposes that nonlethal torture could be "legally limited
to convicted terrorists who had knowledge of future massive terrorist
acts." 149 As articulated, this "principled break" allows torture even if
the act is not imminent but is threatened in the "future." So too, the
stipulation of "massive" terrorist acts raises the question of whether
the threatened act must endanger dozens, hundreds, or thousands of
persons-or indeed, even "massive" loss of property or earnings. The
only hard "break" seems to be a requirement that the torture be "le-
gally limited to convicted terrorists."
Yet, in a true "ticking bomb" situation, there would hardly be time
for a criminal trial and conviction. Professor Dershowitz's show piece
is a hypothetical in which suspected terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui is
detained and subjected to torture shortly before September 11 .'5" As
we know, in reality, criminal prosecution of Mr. Moussaoui remains
unfinished after two years; torturing a terrorist after his conviction
seems unlikely to achieve much in the way of terror prevention. In-
deed, Professor Dershowitz's discussion seems to contemplate tortur-
ing not only convicted terrorists, but "terrorist suspects,"' suspects as
to whom there is "compelling evidence" that they have information
needed to prevent a "terrorist attack";'52 and those as to whom there is
a showing of "probable cause."53 If Professor Dershowitz has a hard
time maintaining the "principled break" in the quiet of his study, it
seems unreasonable to expect judges on the firing line to maintain it
in the face of insistent prosecutorial assertions of potential devasta-
tion.
Let us grant, however, that some requests for torture warrants will
be turned down, and that the prospect of a skeptical judicial eye will
prevent others from being presented. To carry the weight of his ar-
gument, Professor Dershowitz would still need to show that the abuse
149 WHY TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 11, at 147.
150 Id. at 143-44.
151 Id. at 138, 151, 158-59. It is worth noting the number of "terrorist suspects" who were
arrested in the aftermath of September 11, but were later determined to be entirely innocent.
See, e.g., In re Material Witness Warrant, 214 F. Supp. 2d 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); United States v.
Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (dismissing the indictment of a defendant
held as a material witness and "treated as a high security federal prisoner" despite "any claim
that there was probable cause to believe he had violated any law"); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL, supra note 4, at 69-71 (criticizing "the indiscriminate and haphazard manner in
which the labels of 'high interest,' 'of interest,' or 'of undetermined interest' were applied to
many aliens who had no connection to terrorism").
152 WHYTERRORISM WORKS, supra note 11, at 158-59.
153 Id. at 135.
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avoided by the denial of the warrants exceeds the abuse that his pro-
posal would generate. This is a hard case to make.
The first danger is that, in the words of Judge Posner, "having
been regularized, the practice will become regular." 1 54 The demand
for warrants under Professor Dershowitz's system is likely to exceed
the level of informal abuse under the current regime. Under a rule
of official prohibition, a functionary who declines to abuse a suspect
can defend her actions by announcing that she is following the law.
If torture becomes an official option, a functionary must be prepared
tojustify not applying for the warrant in each case. Torture will be an
ever-present option, and there will be no psychic cost in seeking to
exercise it, because officials will be able to offload moral responsibil-
ity for the torture onto the issuing judge. Modern regimes, more-
over, seem to find that torture is most effectively deployed by a corps
of trained officers who can dispense it with cold and measured preci-
115sion, and such bureaucrats will predictably seek outlets for their
skills. An institutionalized group of torturers will press for judges to
issue torture warrants, and some of those warrants will issue errone-
ously.
In addition, to institutionalize the use of torture would sap the
force of norms that constrain potential torturers. Under the current
system, the temptation to investigative excess is cabined by a bright
line rule: torture is impermissible. If torture is permitted with a war-
rant, it will become increasingly difficult for officials under pressure
to produce results to refrain from torture without one. Those who
would engage in abuse under the current system will be encouraged,
should they believe the occasion warrants it; those who seek to resist
abuse will lose moral stature.
Some officials will tend to view their legally permitted scope of ac-
tion as the starting point from which to push the envelope in pursuit
of their appointed task. Officials who, in the absence of Professor
Dershowitz's system, would be willing to engage in physical abuse in
defiance of an absolute legal prohibition would, presumably, be
equally willing to engage in "civil disobedience" against the actual or
154 Richard A. Posner, The Best Offense, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 2, 2002, at 28, 30 (reviewing WHY
TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 11). It should be noted that in Judge Posner's emphatic view,
"[I]f the stakes are high enough, torture is permissible. No one who doubts that this is the case
should be in a position of responsibility." Id. Judge Posner takes issue with Professor Dershow-
itz's procedural prescription that such occasions justify the adoption of a "torture warrant."
155 See generally JOHN CONROY, UNSPEAKABLE ACTS, ORDINARY PEOPLE (2000) (portraying tor-
ture perpetrated in Belfast, Israel, and Chicago); MIKA HARITOS-FATOUROS, THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF INSTITUTIONALIZED TORTURE (2003) (describing training of Greek
torturers); MARTHA K. HUGGINS ET AL., VIOLENCE WORKERS: POLICE TORTURERS AND
MURDERERS RECONSTRUCT BRAZILIAN ATROCITIES (2002) (describing training of Brazilian tor-
turers).
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possible denial of their proffered warrant request. The wider the
scope of legally permitted action, the wider the resulting expansion
of extralegal physical pressure.56
Other officials will be inclined, by duty or morality, to respect the
minima of civilized behavior. As long as our law articulates a norm
that officials have an obligation to act decently even when confront-
ing terror, the official inclined to act with basic decency but con-
fronted with occupational temptation has a basis to claim that she ful-
fills her duty, rather than abandons it, when she acts humanely. 157 By
contrast, in response to pressure from peers or superiors to cut cor-
ners, a conscientious official under a torture warrant regime can rely
on no inflexible norm of civilized behavior. "The judge would not
approve the warrant" is hardly as snappy a retort in the squadroom or
midnight safe-house as "we are not Nazis." 5s
In what seems to be one of the earliest discussions of "ticking
bomb" cases, Professor Charles Black posed the problem of whether
156 See, e.g., EVANS & MORGAN, supra note 122, at 55 ("IT]he 'law of inevitable increment-
whatever powers the police have they will exceed by a given margin."' (citation omitted)). Oren
Gross noted:
When great calamities (real or perceived) occur, governmental actors tend to do what-
ever is necessary to neutralize the threat. Yet ... it is extremely dangerous to provide for
such eventualities within the framework of the legal system ... because of the large risks
of contaminating and manipulating that system, and the deleterious message involved in
legalizing such actions.
Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE
L.J. 1011, 1099-1102 (2003).
157 See Kreimer, Dark Matter, supra note 1, at 504-05; Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About
First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 852 (1994) (arguing that constitutional enforcement pro-
vides an "alternative vision" for "good cop[s]" to follow).
158 MARAN, supra note 144, at 117 (quoting the rationale of General Bollardihre, who refused
to order torture: the French "were not Nazis"); id. at 114 (discussing Bollardire's order to
troops to reject "temptation which totalitarian countries have not resisted" (quoting MASSU,
supra note 148, at 222)).
Professor Levinson acknowledges with vehemence the danger of how a system of "torture
warrants" might "take us down the road to accepting torture as relatively routine-since supine
judges would grant the entreaties of overly aggressive security agencies." Levinson, Sanford Lev-
inson Replies, supra note 12, at 93. He suggests the possibility, nonetheless, that in the absence of
a system for ex ante review, potential torturers will "realize that the actual prospects of [retro-
spective] punishment are very low," and conclude that torture is legitimate. Id.; see also Levin-
son, Precommitment, supra note 12, at 2042-49 (discussing examples of torturers avoiding liability
or condemnation).
In evaluating these two dangers, it seems to me, Professor Levinson initially misses the point
that prospective review is likely to legitimize torture on the basis of imaginary horribles which
will never come to pass, while retrospective review will be more likely to respond only to dem-
onstrated realities. More importantly, Professor Levinson underestimates the expressive power
of law in favor of a Holmsian positivism and hard-edged legal realism. The self-justifying argu-
ments of torturers recounted by Professor Levinson are not phrased in terms of the fact that
torturers may be able to "get away with" the torture; they rest on claims that the torturers have
done the right thing. A "public, written opinion" issuing a torture warrant, id. at 2048, is likely
to give more aid and comfort to such individuals (and to dispirit those who seek to avoid inhu-
manity more) than even a high possibility that torturers will be absolved of punishment.
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to resort to torture "if an atom bomb were ticking somewhere in the
city, and the roads were closed and the trains were not running, and
the man who knew where the bomb was hidden sat grinning and si-
lent in a chair at the country police station twenty miles away." 59 Pro-
fessor Black argued that while "[t] he right not to be tortured cannot,
literally, be an 'absolute' . . . the right not to be tortured is entirely
unsuitable for 'balancing' against competing considerations of con-
venience, comfort, and safety, as we 'balance' ... the ordinary affairs
of life, with a view to setting the course of prudence." 160 The situation
where a right against torture would be overridden, he maintained,
would be so rare that the rule of absolute prohibition "most faithfully
approximates and renders the attitudes and probable actions of most
decent people," and it is the only judge who insists on allegiance to
an absolute prohibition whom we can trust to decide such cases. 6'
The judge who issues a "torture warrant" in the ordinary course of
business is not likely to be such a judge; and, mutatis mutandis, the




Faced with a threat of mass devastation that can be avoided only
through torture, could an American official believe, as a matter of
morality and public policy, that she should choose the path of the
torturer as the lesser evil? On this question, I am prepared to con-
cede that there is room for debate, as there is room for debate as to
whether under extraordinary circumstances a public official should
159 Charles L. Black, Jr., Mr. Justice Black, the Supreme Court, and the Bill of Rights, HARPER'S
MAG., Feb. 1961, at 63, 67.
160 Id.
161 Id. See Guido Calabresi, Foreword, Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What
the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARv. L. REv. 80, 116 & n.108 (1991) (approving Professor
Black's position). Judge Calabresi echoes Black's rhetorical question:
Whom would you trust more to decide both the case of the hydrogen bomb and torture
cases generally, as we want them decided .... ajudge who in hard and easy cases is always
declaring that we must balance the costs and benefits of torture, or the judge who an-
nounces that our system has an absolute prohibition against torture?
GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 174 (1982); see also Yale Kamisar,
Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Problems Presented by the Compelling, Heartwrenching Case, 88J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1121, 1145 & nn.93-94 (1998) ("[B]y refusing to acknowledge that we
should balance the costs and benefits of torture as a general matter, we strengthen the pre-
sumption against torture and maximize the likelihood that it will only be resorted to in the rar-
est and most compelling circumstances.").
162 Cf Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29J.
LEGAL STUD. 1005, 1009 (2000) ("[Acknowledging the moral fault of a tragic decision] keeps
the mind of the chooser firmly on the fact that his action is an immoral action, which it is always
wrong to choose. The recognition that one has 'dirty hands' is not just self-indulgence: it has
significance for future actions.").
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choose to violate any provision of the Constitution. But on the ques-
tion of whether scholars or courts should announce before the fact
that the Constitution permits torture, the answer seems clearer: ours
is not a Constitution that condones such actions. An official who
proclaims fidelity to the Constitution cannot in the same breath claim
the right to use methods "too close to the rack and the screw to per-
mit of constitutional differentiation."
